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Introduction 
 
Political economy emerged as a scientific dicipline in the late eighteenth 
century together with the works of scholars such as Adam Smith who investigated the 
ways nations prosper and the policies which procure nations’ wealth (Hall, 1997: 174). 
According to Groenewegen (1991), the term political economy was first used by 
Montchrestien (1615) in France in the seventeenth century and the first English 
economist who used “political economy” in the title of his book was Sir James Steuart 
(1767).  
Although the term “economics” generally represented “political economy” 
until the late nineteenth century political factors which are not easily formalized were 
downplayed by the development of Neoclassical Economics which emphasized 
optimization by economic agents under certain constraints (Drazen, 2000). However, 
by taking into account the rising interest in the effects of political factors on economic 
outcomes over the last decades, it is justified to state that “new political economy” 
appears as a significant research area in recent years (Drazen, 2000). 
Political economy mainly focuses on three issues which generally separate it 
from economics (Hall, 1997): 
1- Political economists investigate the issues about power and they 
specifically analyze how a given set of economic arrangements affect the 
distribution of power and resources among social groups. 
2- Political economists stress the significance of institutional arrangements 
and they examine the influence of different institutional structures on the 
operation of markets. 
3- Political economists dwell on the basic conceptions of the economy which 
are developed to model economic issues and they mainly seek for the 
origins of these conceptions and how these conceptions become influential.  
 
Institutions as determinants of economic performance 
 
Insititutions and the effect of different institional structures on the markets are 
among the main research areas of political economy. 
 As it is well-known, economists have long debated the determinants of 
differences in growth rates of countries. In 1960s, the Neoclassical Economic Growth 
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Model developed by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) was the main 
economic growth theory and this model attributed the different growth rates of 
countries to the different rates of capital per worker of every country. During 1980s, 
Endogenous Growth Theory emerged. While the first models of Endogenous Growth 
Theory developed by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) were similar to the Neoclassical 
Economic Growth Model except that capital was extended to contain human 
components, later models developed by Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) emphasized technological progress as the determinant 
of differences in growth rates of different countries (Barro, 1996). However, the results 
of empirical analyses show that even if the differences in physical capital, human 
capital and technological progress are taken into account there are still substantial 
differences in growth rates of countries which can not be explained by these factors 
(Helpman, 2008).  
In 1990s, it was clarified that the differences in growth rates of different 
countries could not be explained by solely addressing to capital accumulation or 
technological progress and this fact resulted to a new literature which focused on the 
relationship between institutions and economic performance (Ugur, 2010). The main 
proposition of this literature is that institutions are more influential on economic 
performance than capital accumulation or technological progress since they shape the 
environment in which these activities occur (Helpman, 2008). Hence, the differences 
in economic performance along with time and space stem from the different 
institutional structures of countries (North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).  
Although the term institutions have long been used in the realm of social 
sciences, there is still not a generally accepted definition of this term (Hodgson, 2006). 
Most of the researchers define institutions as “the rules of the game” (Voigt, 2013). 
According to North (1994), institutions are defined as “humanly devised formal (such 
as rules, laws) and informal (such as norms of behaviour, conventions) constraints that 
determine the incentive structures of communities and in particular economies”. 
Hodgson (2006) identify institutions as “systems of established and prevailing social 
rules that shape social intereactions”. Similarly, Greif (2006) defines institutions as “a 
system of rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that create a regularity of social 
behaviour together”. Payne and Losada (1999) use a broader definition of institutions 
than the others. According to these authors, “institutions are the set of formal rules 
(laws, procedures etc.) and informal norms and rules (habits, social convictions etc.) 
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as well as the organizations which create, pursue and enforce these rules and norms.” 
(Payne and Losada, 1999). However, Ugur (2010) argues that institutions and 
organizations are different concepts since instituitons may be created as solutions to 
collective action issues and they cannot be reduced to the actions of organizations or 
organizational rules.  
As it clearly emerges from the above explanations, there is not a unanimous 
definition of institutions and different authors emphasize the different aspects of 
institutions.  
Since the scope and dimensions of institutions are not clear-cut, there are 
different measures of institutions. According to Glaeser et al. (2004), the most 
frequently used indicators in recent analyses are survey indicators of institutional 
quality from the International Country Risk Guide, the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators collected by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011) and Polity IV data set 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2007).  
International Country Risk Guide provides financial, political, and economic 
risk information and forecasts for 140 countries. Moreover, International Country Risk 
Guide’s business oriented model investigates country specific factors such as currency 
risk, the military and religion in politics and corruption.  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure six dimensions of governance 
which are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). The aggregate 
indicators are calculated from several hundred individual variables and the data 
represents the views on governance of survey respondents and experts in public, 
private and NGO sectors (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). 
Finally, the Polity IV data set measures the authority characteristics of states in 
the world system (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). The latest data set of Polity IV Project 
covering the period over 1800-2016 represents democratic and autocratic “patterns of 
authority” and regime changes in 167 countries.  
Although the above-mentioned data sets are frequently used to measure 
institutional quality in empirical analyses they are also crtiticized by some researchers. 
Woodruff (2006) argues that there is a high correlation between different measures of 
institutions and hence, separating the effects of different institutions is almost 
impossible. Glaeser et al. (2004) state that commonly used indicators of institutions 
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measure the outcome of policy choices instead of the institutions themselves. In recent 
years, there are some attempts to measure institutions more precisely (Voigt, 2013). 
However, there is still not a generally accepted, flawless measure of institutions. 
Hence, more analyses are needed in order to reach better measures of institutions.  
Despite the fact that there is not a unanimous definition and a flawless measure 
of institutions there are numereous studies which prove that institutions affect 
economic performance (see for instance; Commander and Nikoloski, 2010; Nawaz, 
2015 and Constantine, 2017). However, when it comes to the determinants of 
institutions and institutional quality, existing evidence is less organized (Straub, 2000). 
  
The Determinants of Institutions 
 
In the existing empirical literature, various factors are taken into account as 
potential determinants of institutions and institutional quality. These factors are 
categorized under four main groups (Straub, 2000; Mijiyawa, 2013): historical 
variables, political incentive variables, rent variables and cultural variables1.  
The first group contains historical variables. The pioneers of the argument that 
focuses on the influence of historical variables on institutions are Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001, 2003). According to these authors, Europeans’ different 
colonization policies in different colonies leaded to extractive institutions that did not 
provide much protection for private property and checks and balances or institutions 
that underlined private property and checks against government power (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002).  
The second group covers political incentive variables. According to the authors 
who emphasize the role of political system, institutions are determined by a group of 
individuals who control political power (Mijiyawa, 2013). Acemoglu (2002) puts 
forward that inefficient institutions are chosen by politicians or social groups who hold 
political power since the chosen institutions serve their interests. The empirical papers 
that investigate the effect of political factors on institutions find that stronger checks 
and balances lead to better institutions (Straub, 2000).  
                                                          
1 According to Straub (2000), there are also bureaucratic incentives which can affect the institutions and 
institutional quality. However, Straub (2000) states that it is a complement to rents. Because of this fact, 
bureaucratic incentives are not explained here as a separate category.  
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The third group includes rent variables.  In economic theory, it is stated that 
the existence of rents increases the likelihood of public officials to deviate from honest 
behaviour (Straub, 2000). Exogenous rents which stem from the natural resource 
endowments of a country and non-natural rents which emanate from dimensions of 
economic organizations that lead to monopolistic power are investigated in the 
literature (Siba, 2008). In the existing empirical literature, the results of many analyses 
show that natural and non-natural rents have negative effects on the quality of 
institutions (Treisman, 2000; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Leite and Weidmann (1999); 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). 
Finally, the fourth group involves cultural variables. In the literature, it is 
suggested that cultural variations or variations in ideological beliefs can result in 
differences in economic institutions (Mijiyawa, 2013). Culture is an ambiguous 
concept and has several dimensions. According to Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010), 
culture is generally described “as the set of values and beliefs people have about how 
the world works as well as the norms of behaviour derived from that set of values”. In 
terms of institutional outcomes, Tabellini (2008) defines culture “as a set of principles 
and normative rules that motivate individuals”. 
Researchers who stress the effects of cultural factors on institutions put forward 
that different beliefs and behaviours of different communities form their collective 
action, the quality of their governments and institutions (Mijiyawa, 2013). This 
argument was first suggested by Weber (1930) in his book “Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism”. Weber (1930) stated that culture was a crucial factor in 
explaining differences in economic development. Putman, Leonardi and Nonetti 
(1993) investigated regional governments that were created by central government at 
the beginning of the 1970s. Although it was expected that these new regional 
governments would identically work, the authors stated that in practice their works 
were different. According to them, this difference stemmed from dissimilarities in 
levels of cooperation, participation, social interaction and trust which are the key 
features of social capital. 
One of the core dimensions of culture is religion. There are quite a few studies 
that examine the impact of different religions and the level of religiosity on institutions 
and institutional quality in the existing literature. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that 
religion can determine cultural attitudes toward social hierarchy and empirically find 
that countries with high proportions of Catholics or Muslims experience poor quality 
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in governmental activities. Treisman (2000, 2007) examine the determinants of 
corruption and find that countries with Protestant tradition are less corrupt that the 
countries with other religions. North, Orman and Gwin (2013) investigate the 
relationship between religion, corruption and the rule of law by using an extensive data 
set covering 207 countries. According to the empirical results, North, Orman and Gwin 
(2013) suggest that both corruption and the rule of law are related with the religious 
heritage of a country.  
Besides institutional quality, religion can also affect the level of individuals’ 
happiness and their political choices. Many studies empirically examine the 
relationship between religion, religiosity and happiness. One of the first studies 
belongs to James (1902) who puts forward that religion played a crucial role with 
regard to the people’s happiness. By reviewing existing empirical analyses, Lewis and 
Cruise (2006) state that while the results of many studies indicate a positive association 
between religion and happiness, there are also some studies with contradictory results 
(see for example; Lewis, Maltby and Burkinshaw, 2000).  In a recent study, Ngamaba 
and Soni (2017) examine the influence of different religions on happiness and life 
satisfaction and investigate whether the effect of religion on happiness and life 
satisfaction can change together with the economic and cultural environment of the 
country. By using World Values Survey covering the period between 1981 and 2014 
Ngamaba and Soni (2017) find that individual religiosity and the level of development 
of a country are significant determinants of individuals’ subjective well-being. 
Moreover, the authors find that Protestants, Buddhists and Roman Catholics are 
happier in comparison to other religious groups (Ngamaba and Soni, 2017). Although 
there are numerous studies that focus on the relationship between religion, religiosity 
and happiness, further surveys and analyses are needed in order to reach more robust 
and certain results with regard to the effect of religion on happiness (Rizvi and 
Hossain, 2017).  
As a significant aspect of culture, religion and religiosity can influence 
individuals’ voting behaviour. Although religion and religiosity were disregarded as a 
determinant of voting behaviour during the 1990s, in recent years a number of 
researchers in Europe suggest that religion is still an important factor to be taken into 
account in voting analyses (Goldberg, 2014). In the existing literature, while some 
studies investigate the voting behaviour of individuals who belong to different 
religions, other studies analyse the relationship between religiosity and electoral 
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choices (Esmer and Pettersson, 2007). According to the results of many empirical 
studies, it is confirmed that religion and religiosity are significant determinants of 
voting behaviour in Western countries (Esmer and Pettersson, 2007). However, the 
number of studies that examine the relationship between religion, religiosity and 
electoral choices in other countries is very low. Thus, further empirical studies are 
needed in order to understand the effects of religion and religiosity on the voting 
behaviour of individuals who live in the countries outside the Western world.  
 
Contents of the dissertation  
 
The aim of this work is to investigate the effects of religion and religiosity on 
corruption, individuals’ happiness and voting behaviour. Although there are many 
studies which examine these issues, we provide new evidence by using different data 
sets and methodologies and by focusing on the countries which are not analysed in the 
previous studies.  
The first chapter2 analyses the relationship between religion and the attitude 
toward corruption at the individual level. Corruption is a fundamental dimension of 
institutions, which has been shown to have detrimental effects on investment and 
growth (Mauro, 1995). A channel through which culture can shape institutions is the 
impact of religion on corruption. In the existing literature, there are many empirical 
studies which examine the determinants of corruption including religion. However, the 
majority of these studies draws on country-level data sets and hence, does not take into 
account the heterogeneity of individuals inside a country by aggregating all 
individuals. Moreover, these studies do not allow investigating whether the behaviour 
of individuals related to corruption is conditional to the fact that their religion 
dominates in their country. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold: First, by examining 
the impact of religion on attitude toward corruption at the individual level we provide 
a thorough analysis of this issue in comparison to country-level studies. Second, we 
assess the attitude toward corruption of individuals across countries with different 
majority religions and thus we check whether the impact of religious denominations 
on the attitude toward corruption is universal or conditional to the status of the religion. 
                                                          
2 This chapter refers to the article co-written with Laurent Weill. The article was presented at the 
European Public Choice Society Conference in 2017.  
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Furthermore, we investigate the influence of religious denominations in four countries 
with several large religious groups in order to do a more comprehensive analysis.  
In the empirical analysis of this chapter, we use World Values Survey Wave 6 
covering the period between 2010 and 2014. Since we aim to explain attitude toward 
corruption we draw on the question to what extent “Someone accepting a bribe in the 
course of their duties” is justifiable. The answer to this question is a categorical 
variable on ten points scale with higher values represent more justifiability to 
corruption. We focus on the major religions in the world in line with the previous 
studies on the influence of religion. For religiosity, we draw on the frequency of 
attendance to the religious services and the frequency of pray.  
As a first step, we estimate our model by using only one of the 
religion/religiosity variables together with the control variables. After that, we 
estimate the model once again by adding the interaction terms between religious 
denomination and religious attendance/pray. Then, we separately estimate the model 
for the countries in which the dominant religion is Roman Catholicism, Orthodox 
Christianity, Protestantism and Islam. Finally, we estimate our model for multi-
religious countries, which are Germany, Lebanon, Malaysia and Nigeria. 
The results of this empirical analysis indicate that religious people are less 
tolerant to corruption and attitudes toward corruption differ across religious 
denominations. Moreover, the results show that the effect of religious denominations 
is not universal and the attitude of individuals toward corruption can be influenced by 
the fact that their religion is majority or minority. 
The second chapter3 assesses the effect of religion on happiness. Although 
there are quite a few studies that investigate the relationship between religion and 
various economic indicators (for literature review, see Dolan et al. (2008)) the number 
of analyses that focus on the relationship between religion and happiness is very low. 
Existing empirical analyses take into account either the effect of religious 
denominations or religiosity on happiness (Bjørnskov et al., 2008, Clark and Lelkes, 
2009, Deaton and Stone, 2013). In contrast to previous studies, we control for religious 
membership and intensity of religiosity at the same time. To the best of our knowledge, 
                                                          
3 This chapter refers to the article co-written with Jan Fidrmuc. The article was presented at the European 
Public Choice Society Conference in 2015 and was published as a CESifo Working Paper (Working 
Paper No: 5437). 
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this is the first study which considers both the effect of belonging to a religion and 
intensity of religiosity on happiness. 
In our empirical analysis, we use the first four waves of the European Social 
Survey carried out every two years between 2000 and 2008 in 30 countries in Europe 
and its neighborhood. Our dependent variable is the participants’ answers to the 
following question: “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?”. 
Religious denominations that we take into account in our analysis are Roman 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Other Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam and another category which covers individuals with no religious 
affiliation and other non-Christian affiliation. For religiosity, we use a question on the 
intensity of respondents’ devotion and we consider participation in religious activities  
We observe that religion increases happiness. However, when we take into 
account both religious membership and religious devotion we find that religious 
membership without religious devotion lower happiness. So we argue that the spiritual 
and belief-based aspect of religion raises happiness. Moreover, the differences 
between men and women are significant. Women are more negatively affected by 
belonging to a religion and gain more due to religiosity.  
The third chapter4 investigates the determinants of voting behaviour of Turkish 
citizens and specifically focuses on how gender-related differences in voting 
behaviour shaped the rise of the AKP in Turkey. Although gender differences in 
political attitudes and voting behaviour have dramatic effects on the results of elections 
both in developed and developing countries, the majority of studies examines this issue 
for developed countries. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing 
evidence with regard to the voting behaviour of individuals in Turkey which is both a 
developing and a Muslim country.  
In recent years, the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP, its Turkish 
acronym) has risen in the Turkish political sphere. Turkey under AKP has gradually 
abandoned the strict secularism. On the one hand, this has arguably increased religious 
freedom. On the other hand, the greater acceptance of Islamic norms may have an 
asymmetrically adverse effect on women’s lives since a conservative interpretation of 
Islamic norms attributes different roles to men and women in most aspects of everyday 
                                                          
4 This chapter refers to the article co-written with Jan Fidrmuc. The article was presented at the European 
Public Choice Society Conference in 2014 and was published as a CESifo Working Paper (Working 
Paper No: 5226). 
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life. Hence, there may be differences in support for the AKP among male and female 
voters.  
In our empirical analysis, we investigate the determinants of support for the AKP 
and for the main opposition party which is the Republican’s People Party (known as 
CHP, its Turkish acronym). We use European Social Survey Wave 2 (collected in 
2004) and Wave 4 (collected in 2008) which include information on past voting 
behaviour in the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively. Our dependent variable takes 
the value of 1 if the respondent voted for the party in question in the last election and 
zero otherwise. Our explanatory variables represent participants’ socio-economic 
characteristics such as age, gender, number of years of education, marital status etc. 
together with religiosity. 
The results of our empirical analysis indicate that education and religiosity are 
significant determinants of men’s and women’s voting behaviour. Whilst the effect of 
religiosity on men’s and women’s voting behaviour is same the effect of education 
differs with regard to gender. We find that women’s support for the AKP falls with 
increasing education levels while men’s support for the AKP rises first and then falls. 
The support for CHP, the main opposition party, is opposite. However, this result only 
prevails in the 2002 election. In the 2007 election, education has a negative effect on 
the votes for the AKP for both men and women. Moreover, a standard gender gap 
emerges in the 2007 election, with women more likely to vote for the CHP than men.  
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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the relation between religion and 
attitude toward corruption at the individual level. We use World Values Survey data 
covering 59 countries during the period 2010-2014 to examine if religiosity and 
religious denominations are associated with attitude toward corruption. We find that 
religious people are more averse to corruption, supporting the view that religiosity 
favors honest behaviour. Attitudes toward corruption differ across religious 
denominations. Protestantism and Hinduism are associated with greater aversion to 
corruption than Atheism, while other religions do not have clear difference. This 
conclusion accords with the view that hierarchical religions favor greater tolerance to 
corruption than individualistic religions. Additional estimations on groups of countries 
with different dominant religions and on multi-religious countries show however that 
the relation between religious denomination and tolerance to corruption can vary with 
the religious environment of the country. 
 
Keywords: religion, corruption. 
JEL Codes: H11, K42, Z12 
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1. Introduction 
“Corruption is a greater evil than sin” 
– Pope Francis. 
 
The debate on the causes of economic development is far from settled. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) argue that institutions give rise to economic growth, considering 
little credit to the potential impact of culture. However, others claim that even if 
institutions explain why countries are rich or poor, culture can explain institutions in 
the first place (Greif, 1994; North, 2005). 
A channel through which culture can shape institutions is the impact of religion 
on corruption. Corruption is a core dimension of institutions which has been shown to 
have detrimental effects on investment and growth (Mauro, 1995). As such, corruption 
constitutes a major piece of the institutions-growth nexus. 
Religion can exert an impact on tolerance to corruption in different ways. First, 
religiosity is expected to promote honest behaviour in line with the abovementioned 
quotation of Pope Francis. North, Orman and Gwin (2013) observe that religion as a 
whole helps sustaining a social order by encouraging standards for behaviour. As a 
consequence, religious people might be more prone to good social behaviour and 
might then have lower tolerance to corruption. Second, religious denominations can 
exert different influences on attitude toward corruption depending on the fact that they 
are associated with hierarchical or individualistic religions. Putnam (1993) considers 
that hierarchical religions (Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam) create 
vertical bonds of obligation in society. Thus, Treisman (2000) argues that they favor 
attitudes with respect for authority and therefore lead to lower contestation of office-
holders. Hierarchical religions should therefore be associated to higher tolerance to 
corruption than individualistic religions like Protestantism. 
A large body of empirical literature has investigated the determinants of 
corruption including religion. However, most works about the impact of religion on 
corruption consider a country-level investigation (La Porta et al., 1997; Treisman, 
2000; Gokcekus, 2008; North, Orman and Gwin, 2013). As a consequence, they cannot 
take into account the heterogeneity of individuals inside a country by aggregating all 
individuals. Also they do not allow investigating whether the behaviour of individuals 
related to corruption is conditional to the fact that their religion dominates in their 
country, while the minority group status can influence attitudes (Kuran, 2004). 
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Very few works provide a micro-level analysis on the impact of religion on 
corruption. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) provide a broad investigation on the 
links between religion and economic attitudes in which they document the relation 
between religion and attitude toward corruption. They find support for the impact of 
religiosity and religious denominations. 
The aim of our paper is to investigate how religion affects attitude toward 
corruption. To address this issue, we use the latest wave of the World Values Survey. 
It contains information on human beliefs and values for 59 countries. We advance the 
understanding of the relation between religion and attitude toward corruption in two 
respects. 
First, we provide a cross-country analysis investigating the relation between 
religion and attitude toward corruption at the individual level. Religion is considered 
through religious denominations and religiosity. We are therefore able to provide an 
in-depth investigation of the influence of religion on tolerance to corruption in 
comparison to country-level analyses. In comparison with Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2003) who use the three waves implemented between 1981 and 1997, we 
utilize the most recent available data with World Values Survey last wave performed 
on the period 2010-2014. 
Second, we examine how the influence of religious denominations can be 
conditional to the importance of other religions. For instance, the behaviour of 
Protestants is different if it is a majority religion or a minority religion in a country. In 
that latter case, do Protestants behave more like the majority of the country or like 
Protestants all around the world? By comparing the attitude toward corruption of 
individuals across countries with different majority religion, we are able to check 
whether the relation between religious denominations and tolerance to corruption is 
universal or conditional to the status of the religion. To obtain a more complete picture, 
we also examine the impact of religious denominations in four countries with several 
large religious groups (Germany, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria) so that we have a 
thorough comparison of the potential influence of Catholicism, Protestantism, and 
Islam, on attitude toward corruption. We thus provide a much deeper investigation of 
the impact of religion on corruption than Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003). 
Our paper relates to two current strands of the literature. The first strand of 
literature incorporates the debate on the influence of religion on economic outcomes. 
Following Barro and McCleary (2003), there is a considerable body of literature on 
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how religion shapes economic attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003; Kumar, 
Page, and Spalt, 2011). We contribute to propose a worldwide micro-level analysis 
taking into account the majority or minority status of a religion and therefore provide 
a contribution on how religion can shape institutions. 
The second strand of literature deals to the determinants of corruption. We 
supplement the investigation of the determinants of corruption at the macro level 
(Treisman, 2000; Gokcekus, 2008) by adding information on how a key element of 
cultural values, religion, influences tolerance to corruption at the individual level and 
by focusing on attitude toward corruption rather than actual or perceived corruption. 
Understanding attitude toward corruption can contribute to enhance the efficiency of 
policies implemented to prevent and as such can help reducing it. If one religion favors 
tolerance to corruption in a global way, then reducing corruption in countries with this 
religion for the majority of people can be particularly difficult. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents hypotheses and related 
literature. Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Hypotheses and related literature 
 
This section is devoted to the background of our research question. We first 
develop the hypotheses on the relation between corruption and religion. We then 
review the former studies on this link. 
 
2.1 Hypotheses 
 
Corruption is generally defined as “the use of public office for private gains, 
where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the 
principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is 
difficult to monitor for the principal” (Bardhan, 1997: 1321). Although almost all 
countries have experienced corruption scandals, the frequency and intensity of these 
scandals dramatically change from one country to the other. However, researchers 
have taken these differences between countries as given for a long time (Treisman, 
2007). In recent years, with the emergence of a number of indices which measure the 
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level of corruption at the country level, research has started to investigate the causes 
and the consequences of corruption. 
Although there are many factors which affect the eagerness of a person to be 
involved in corruption religion can be one of the significant determinants of corrupt 
practices in a society (Beets, 2007). At first sight, since many religions establish some 
standards for behaviour a religious society may be more inclined to be honest and to 
obey the rules than a less religious society (North, Orman and Gwin, 2013). So it may 
be expected that corruption is a more severe problem in societies which are not pious 
than the ones in which religion is an important part of people’s daily lives.  
However, the observed discrepancies in terms of frequency and intensity of 
corruption among societies that adhere to different religions suggest that there may be 
significant differences between religions that explain why some countries are more 
corrupt than the others. In fact, majority of studies in the existing literature put forward 
that based on the prevalent values and belief systems in a specific religious sect 
religion could either help to decrease or increase corruption (Sommer, Bloom and 
Arikan, 2013).  
Treisman (2000) states that religion determines the attitudes of a society towards 
social hierarchy and he argues that in societies where hierarchical religions 
(Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam) are dominant defying to a civil servant 
may be uncommon than in societies where egalitarian or individualistic religions (for 
example, Protestantism) are dominant1. Furthermore, hierarchical religions lay more 
emphasis on being loyal to family and friends than the individualistic religions. This 
is called as “familism” and may influence the level of nepotism in a society (Banfield, 
1958). In addition to this, people who adhere to hierarchical religions trust less the 
others than the people who belong to individualistic religions. By referring to Putnam 
(1993), La Porta et al. (1997) argue that hierarchical religions have a negative effect 
on the formation of trust because of their emphasis on vertical ties between subordinate 
and superior and thus leads to higher corruption than individualistic religions.  
Besides the differences between religion sects in terms of their values and belief 
systems, the degree of dominance of a religion in a society can be a determining factor 
of the level of corruption. People who belong to the same religion have shared cultural 
values with regard to positive and negative attitudes. For instance, while Protestants 
                                                          
1 Treisman (2000) takes the taxonomy of Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam as hierarchical 
religions from La Porta et al. (1997)’s study.  
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believe that avoiding committing a sin is the responsibility of people Catholicism 
admits the weaknesses of human beings and is more tolerant of errors and sins (Lipset 
and Lenz, 2000). Hence, it is plausible to expect that societies in which religions 
emphasizing the weaknesses of human beings are dominant experience corruption 
much more than the societies where the dominant religion is not tolerant of making 
mistakes.  
We can therefore derive four testable hypotheses with respect to the effect of 
religion on corruption that we test in our empirical analysis: 
H1: Religion matters for attitude toward corruption. 
H2: Religiosity matters for attitude toward corruption. 
H3: Hierarchical religions are associated with greater tolerance to corruption than 
individualistic religions.  
H4: Religion affects attitude toward corruption depending on the fact that it is a 
majority or minority religion in a country.  
 
2.2 Related literature 
  
There is a large strand of empirical literature devoted to corruption. While some 
works document the effects of corruption,2 others seek for the determinants of 
corruption.3 The relation between religion and corruption has however been 
questioned only in a few studies with most of them providing country-level 
investigation. It has to be stressed that all these works concentrate on actual and 
perceived levels of corruption, which constitutes a major difference with our work 
focusing on attitude towards corruption. 
One of the first studies that examine the relationship between corruption and 
religion is La Porta et al. (1997). While the focus of the paper is the impact of trust on 
the performance of large organizations, they also investigate the forces that help the 
formation of trust and state that hierarchical religions may be a factor that leads to 
                                                          
2 See Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997), Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) and Méon and Weill (2010) 
for the effects of corruption on investment, growth and productivity, Alesina and Weder (1999), Wei 
(2000) and Bellos and Subasat (2012) for the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment and 
Mauro (1998), and Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) for the effects of corruption on government 
expenditures, revenues and the quality of public institutions. 
3 See Fisman and Gatti (2002), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Sandholtz and Gray (2003), Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2007), Mocan (2008), Torgler and Valev (2010),  Iwasaki and Suzuki 
(2012). 
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distrust and hence affect the performance of large organizations. They define 
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam as hierarchical religions and use the 
percentage of population adhering to these religions as the variable representing the 
hierarchical religions in their regressions. They find that countries with dominant 
hierarchical religions experience greater corruption. 
In their investigation of the determinants of government performance, La Porta 
et al. (1999) find that countries whose dominant religion is Catholicism or Islam have 
worse governments than the countries whose dominant religion is Protestantism. 
Treisman (2000) investigates the determinants of corruption by drawing on the 
country indices of perceived corruption from Transparency International for the years 
1996, 1997 and 1998. As a robustness check, he also uses perceived corruption index 
of Business International for the early years of 1980s. By taking into account the 
percentage of Protestants in 1980 in the countries under investigation together with 
other institutional (common law or civil law systems, legal system and colonial 
experience, democracy, political instability, state intervention, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and political system) and economic (GDP per capita, trade 
liberalization and large endowments of valuable natural resources) explanatory 
variables, Treisman (2000) argues that Protestant tradition are linked to lower 
corruption. According to the author, this result stems from the positive influence of 
Protestantism on economic development (the Weber argument) and stable democracy 
along with the higher toleration to different opinions or a higher commitment to ethics 
in Protestant societies. Treisman (2000) also puts forward that this finding may be 
related to the fact that Protestantism generally arose as an opposing institution to the 
state and hence the Protestant Church may serve as a monitoring mechanism of the 
state officials.  
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) examine the relationship between corruption and 
religion by offering a theoretical framework which puts forward that the level of 
corruption is determined by political-economic structures of incentives and cultural 
norms. The authors use the 1996 corruption index from Transparency International to 
measure corruption and take into account several explanatory variables such as GDP 
per capita, economic freedom, democracy, democratic years and trade. With regard to 
religion they reach a conclusion similar to Treisman’s (2000) study and suggest that 
the level of corruption is lower in predominantly Protestant countries.  
Paldam (2001) seeks for the influence of culture on corruption by drawing on a 
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data set that covers 100 countries for the year 1999. The author states that culture is a 
vague concept which is not easily quantified. However, he argues that religion can be 
used as a proxy since it is one of the main elements of culture. In the empirical analysis, 
Paldam (2001) takes into account 11 religion groups (Old Christianity, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Anglicanism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Oriental Religions, Tribal 
Religions, Atheists and Others) and the calculations of Herfindahl Index which 
represents religious diversity. At the end of the empirical estimations, Paldam (2001) 
comes to the conclusion that Reform Christianity (which covers Protestantism and 
Anglicanism) and Tribal Religions reduce the level of corruption whilst Pre-Reform 
Christianity (which covers Old Christianity, Catholicism and Orthodoxy) increases it. 
Furthermore, Paldam (2001) suggests that Pre-Reform Christians and Muslims are 
equally corrupt and Islam can be added to the Pre-Reform Christianity in terms of its 
effect on corruption.  
Beets (2007) analyzes the impact of religion on corruption by using non-
parametric statistical measure of Kruskal-Wallis for 133 countries. In the empirical 
analysis, Beets (2007) draws on Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency 
International for the year 2003, the dominant religion practiced in each country, the 
importance of religion to the citizens, religious freedom and GDP per capita. The 
results of this study indicate that the level of corruption in countries whose citizens are 
well-off, have more freedom in terms of religion and do not think that religion is an 
important part of their life is low. In contrast, those whose citizens are poorer have 
comparatively less religious freedom and think that religion is an important part of 
their life is confronted with high level of corruption. Beets (2007) suggests that 
countries where the dominant religion is Christianity incline to be in the first group 
while overwhelmingly Muslim countries incline to be in the second group.  
Gokcekus (2008) investigates whether religious tradition whose influence 
emanates from 100 years ago or present and religious composition has an effect on the 
level of corruption by utilizing 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency 
International and the percentages of Protestants in 1900, 1970, 1990 and 2000. He 
finds that the percentage of Protestants has a negative and significant impact on 
corruption with greater coefficient in absolute value for the percentage of Protestants 
in 1900 and 1970 than for the one in 2000. In the additional estimations, he comes to 
the conclusion that the percentage of Protestants in 1900 is a better explanatory 
variable of corruption than the percentage of Protestants in 2000. 
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In a related vein, North, Orman and Gwin (2013) investigate the effects of the 
country’s dominant religious culture on corruption and rule of law in 203 countries 
with governance indicators from the World Bank for 2004. They find that corruption 
is lowest in countries where the dominant religion was Protestantism in 1900 and is 
highest in countries where the dominant religion was Orthodox Christianity in 1900. 
They conclude that the effect of religion on corruption becomes evident only over 
centuries instead of years.  
Dincer (2008) analyzes how ethnic and religious diversity affect the level of 
corruption in 48 US states over the period 1980-1989 and 1990-1999. The author 
measures the level of corruption by calculating 10 year averages of the number of 
government officials per 100.000 people convicted in a state for crimes and uses 
fractionalization and polarization indexes for ethnic and religious diversity. The 
empirical results of this study show that while religious polarization has a linear and 
positive impact on corruption the relationship between religious fractionalization and 
corruption is inverse-U-shaped. Hence, religious fractionalization has a positive 
impact on corruption until reaching an inflection point and after this point the 
relationship between religious fractionalization and corruption turns out to be negative.  
Unlike the other studies, Sommer, Bloom and Arikan (2013) seek for the impact 
of religion on corruption by using religious regulation and religious discrimination 
against minorities as variables representing religion. The main argument of this study 
is that the effect of religion on corruption is conditional upon the institutional 
framework. They find that while religious freedom has a decreasing effect on 
corruption in a democratic environment it is unlikely to reduce corruption in a non-
democratic environment. Hence, the authors conclude that religion may be an 
important factor in the fight against corruption if and only if with the adequate 
institutional framework.  
Mensah (2014) examines the effects of religion and culture on the levels of 
perceived corruption in 187 countries over the period 2000-2010.  In the empirical 
analysis, the author uses the cultural clusters from House et al. (2004) in order to 
identify cultural dimensions in the world. By categorizing 187 countries into 12 
cultural clusters and by drawing on 3 different corruption measures, Mensah (2014) 
asserts that cultural and religious elements are significant determinants of corruption 
together with political institutions and structures. Furthermore, unlike previous 
studies, the results of this analysis also suggest that not only Protestantism but also 
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Buddhism and to a limited extent Hinduism have a preventive impact on the level of 
perceived corruption. However, non-Protestant Christianity and Islam have much 
lesser preventive impact on corruption in comparison to Protestantism, Buddhism and 
Hinduism. According to these findings, Mensah (2014) concludes that earlier results 
related to Protestantism mainly emanate from the failure to categorize the religions 
adequately. 
In summary, most of the empirical studies in the existing literature focus on the 
macro level effects of religion on corruption and do not take into account the 
differences across individuals with regard to religion and devotion. However, there 
might be significant dissimilarities even among the individuals who adhere to the same 
religion in terms of religious commitment, interpretation of the religion’s teachings 
and the attitudes to ethical issues.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
In our empirical analysis, we use World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 covering 
2010-2014 wave (Inglehart et al. (eds.), World Values Survey: Round Six, 2014). The 
WVS is composed of nationally representative surveys carried out in around 100 
countries and investigates beliefs and values. Wave 6 of the survey includes data which 
is obtained from the interviews with more than 85.000 respondents in 59 countries 
(Inglehart et al. (eds.), World Values Survey: Round Six, 2014).  
We aim to explain attitude toward corruption and consequently we use the 
question from the WVS which asks the respondents to what extent the statement of 
“Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” is justifiable. The answer to 
this question is a categorical variable on ten points scale with higher values represent 
more justifiability to corruption, which we use to create the variable Bribe.  
For religious denomination, there are 98 different religious groups in the WVS. 
Since most options drew very few responses, we decide to focus on the major religions 
in the world in line with former papers on the influence of religion. We therefore 
consider the following religious denominations: Atheism, Buddhism, Protestantism, 
Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism. All other religions 
are included in a heterogeneous category entitled “other religion”, which covers the 
Others category in the questionnaire together with the religious groups that we do not 
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take into account as a separate category in our models. 
We then create seven dummy variables equal to one if the respondent declares 
that he or she belongs to one of the associated religious denominations: Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Other religion, and Atheist. 
Atheist is used as the omitted variable. 
For religiosity, we consider two variables. First, we use the frequency of 
attendance to the religious services (Attendance). It is based on the response on a scale 
from 1 to 7 to the statement: “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do 
you attend religious services these days?” Second, we consider the frequency of pray 
(Pray) of the respondents. It is based on the response on a scale from 1 to 7 to the 
statement: “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray”. In the 
WVS, higher values of these variables represent less frequency of religious attendance 
and pray. For interpretation purposes, we reversed these variables in our models so 
that higher values of Attendance and Pray indicate higher frequency of religious 
attendance and pray, hence greater religiosity. 
To isolate the effect of religion from other effects, we control for country-fixed 
effects and an assortment of individual characteristics. Gender is a dummy variable 
which equals to 1 if the respondent is male. Age is the number of years that the 
respondents have lived. Education level is a 9 points scale variable which takes values 
from 1 to 9 with higher values indicates more education. Income level is a 10 points 
scale variable on which 1 represents lowest income group and 10 represents highest 
income group in the country that the respondents live. State of health is a dummy 
variable which takes the values from 1 to 4 with higher values shows worse state of 
health. We reversed this variable so that higher values indicate better state of health 
for our interpretation purposes. Marital status is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise. Having children is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the respondent has a child or children and 0 
otherwise. We also take into account the frequency of using TV news to obtain 
information, the frequency of using internet to obtain information, in line with 
evidence that mass media can influence the perception of corruption (Besley and Prat, 
2006; Enikolopov, Petrova and Sonin, 2016). Both TV news and internet are 5 points 
scale variables which take the values from 1 to 5 with higher values indicate less 
frequent use of TV and internet in order to obtain information. Similar to religiosity 
and state of health variables, we reversed the values of TV news and internet so that 
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higher values represent more frequent use of TV and internet in order to obtain 
information.  
In our empirical analysis, we first estimate our model by using only one of the 
religion/religiosity variables (religious denomination or religious attendance or pray) 
together with the control variables. Then, we estimate the model once again by taking 
into account the interaction terms between religious denomination and religious 
attendance/pray. After these estimations, we separately estimate the model for the 
countries in which the dominant religion is Roman Catholicism, Orthodox 
Christianity, Protestantism and Islam. Lastly, we estimate our model for multi-
religious countries in our data set. These countries are Germany, Lebanon, Malaysia 
and Nigeria.  
Since our dependent variable is a categorical variable on ten points scale we use 
ordered probit estimator for our estimations. As a robustness check, we also estimate 
our main regressions by employing probit and OLS estimators.  
 
4. Results 
 
Our investigation of the relation between religion and corruption takes place in 
three steps. We first display the main estimations. We then continue with results by 
groups of countries based on the majority religion. We complete the analysis with 
estimations on multi-religious countries and conclude with robustness tests. 
 
4.1 Main estimations 
 
Table 3 reports the main estimations on the relation between religion and 
corruption. We consider five specifications based on alternative combinations of 
religion variables to control for the sensitivity of our results on the relation between 
religion and corruption. Column (1) considers religious denominations. Columns (2) 
and (3) alternatively include one religiosity measure, Pray or Attendance. Columns (4) 
and (5) analyze the simultaneous inclusion of one religiosity measure (Pray or 
Attendance) and religious denomination variables. 
Overall our evidence supports the notion that religion influences tolerance to 
corruption with two main findings. Our first finding is that religiosity reduces tolerance 
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to corruption. We observe a negative and significant coefficient for Pray and 
Attendance in all estimations. In other words, religious people tend to be more averse 
to corruption in line with the expectation that religion fosters honest behaviour and 
makes people obey the rules. 
Our second finding concerns the impact of religious denominations on attitude 
toward corruption. Recalling that the Atheist denomination is the omitted category, we 
detect a negative coefficient for Protestant and for Hindu. These coefficients are 
significant in two specifications (only religious denomination variables, and with 
Attendance) and not significant in one specification (with Pray). In addition, we 
observe a positive coefficient for Catholic, but it is only significant when Pray is 
included in the specification. In contrast, the coefficients for Buddhist, Jew, Muslim, 
and Orthodox, are never significant. We can therefore extract two main conclusions 
from these results. On the one hand, Protestants and Hindus tend to be more averse to 
corruption than Atheists. On the other hand, the other religious affiliations do not seem 
to be associated with higher or lower tolerance to corruption than atheism. 
These results correspond roughly with our predictions. We find results in line 
with the view that religiosity encourages standards for behaviour and as such 
encourages good social behaviour. We find support to the view that individualistic 
religions are associated to lower tolerance to corruption than hierarchical religions 
(Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam), with both religions associated with 
greater aversion of corruption being individualistic religions. 
Our findings overall accord with what has been found at the country level in 
studies explaining the perceived corruption. The finding of lower tolerance to 
corruption for Protestants is in line with the common observation that Protestantism is 
associated with lower perception of corruption (La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; 
Paldam, 2001). The absence of significant difference for tolerance to corruption 
between Catholicism and Islam is in accordance with former works (e.g., Paldam, 
2001). Finally, the finding that Hinduism would be associated with higher aversion to 
corruption has also been observed by Mensah (2014). 
Regarding control variables, we observe consistent and significant results across all 
five specifications. Women, married, older and more educated have a more negative 
attitude toward corruption. In opposition, greater income, better health, and having 
children are associated with more tolerance to corruption. Interestingly higher 
frequency of using TV news is positively related to tolerance to corruption, while 
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higher frequency of using internet is negatively related. 
A natural question that emerges concerns the influence of religiosity on how 
religious denominations are associated with corruption. Namely we can wonder if for 
instance Protestants who are not religious have the same aversion toward corruption 
than non-religious Protestants. 
To this end, we perform additional estimations by including interaction terms 
between religiosity and religious affiliation variables. Table 3 displays these 
estimations. The first column considers interaction terms for religious denominations 
with Pray, while the second column includes those with Attendance. 
The main result is the significantly negative coefficient of all interaction terms 
between religious denominations and both religiosity variables with one exception. 
Therefore, our main conclusion is that religiosity reduces tolerance to corruption 
whatever the religion type. It consequently corroborates our conclusion that religiosity 
is associated with higher aversion to corruption. The only exception is for Judaism, for 
which interaction terms are negative but not significant, which can result from the fact 
that it is the religion with the lowest number of observations in the sample. 
The analysis of the coefficients for religious denomination variables provides 
interesting findings. We observe that Catholic is significantly positive in both 
estimations. It therefore suggests that Catholics have a greater tolerance to corruption 
than Atheists. However, this greater tolerance diminishes with the intensity of 
religiosity of Catholics. The same conclusion stands to a lower degree for Hinduism, 
Islam, Orthodox Church, and Buddhism, with significant and positive coefficients in 
one of both estimations. At the same time, we observe no significant coefficient for 
Protestant variable. Therefore, these results complement our findings on the effect of 
religious denominations on attitude toward corruption. 
Our main estimations have shown the average effect of religious denominations 
without considering how religiosity can influence it. The additional estimations with 
interactions between religious denominations and religiosity therefore show that the 
conclusions on religious denominations need to be qualified by religiosity for most 
religion types. 
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4.2 Estimations by dominant religion 
 
The main estimations have shown the effect of religious denominations on 
attitude toward corruption. However, the fact that a religion dominates or is only 
practiced by a minority can exert an impact on how religion shapes social behaviour. 
We then redo our estimations by distinguishing groups of countries based on the 
dominant religion.  
We define a country as belonging to one group if at least 50% of the respondents 
in a country state they have this religious denomination. Only two countries in our 
sample can then be considered as Protestant countries (Ghana, and Zimbabwe). The 
lack of representativeness of both countries coming from the same continent and the 
small number of countries leads us not to consider Protestant countries. We thus 
consider three groups of countries: Catholic countries, Orthodox countries, and 
Muslim countries. Catholic countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, and Slovenia4. Orthodox countries are 
Belarus, Cyprus, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine5. Muslim countries are Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan6.  
Tables 4 to 6 report the results for each dominant religion. Do we observe the 
same results for religious denominations whatever their majority or minority status? 
The answer is negative for Catholicism and Orthodox Church, but positive for Islam. 
Catholics do not have the same attitude toward corruption if they represent the 
majority or the minority of the population. When Catholicism is the dominant religion, 
Catholics have more tolerance toward corruption than Atheists as observed in Table 4. 
However, in Muslim countries, Catholics have greater aversion toward corruption than 
Atheists as shown in Table 6, while in Orthodox countries, the relation between being 
Catholic and attitude toward corruption is not significant as pointed out in Table 5. 
Orthodox persons tend to have higher aversion toward corruption than Atheists 
                                                          
4 The percentage of Roman Catholics in the total respondents is as follows: Argentina (70.16), Brazil 
(53.11), Chile (64.90), Colombia (61.51), Ecuador (62.70), Mexico (69.69), Peru (74.50), the 
Philippines (69.12), Poland (94.19), Rwanda (55.73), and Slovenia (65.44). 
5 The percentage of Orthodox Christians in the total respondents is as follows: Belarus (73.33), Cyprus 
(67.50), Romania (85.46), Russia (62.56), and Ukraine (73.20). 
6 The percentage of Muslims in the total respondents is as follows: Algeria (99.50), Azerbaijan (97.01), 
Iraq (99.00), Jordan (97.00), Kazakhstan (50.30), Kyrgyz Republic (89.42), Lebanon (55.09), Libya 
(98.23), Malaysia (63.08), Morocco (99.25), Pakistan (99.67), Tunisia (100.00), Turkey (99.13), and 
Uzbekistan (95.70). 
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when they are the majority. We find a negative coefficient for Orthodox in Table 5 for 
estimations with Orthodox Christianity as dominant (not always significant). But they 
have more tolerance toward corruption than Atheists in Catholic countries, while the 
relation between being Orthodox and attitude toward corruption is not significant in 
Muslim countries. 
For Islam, the results do not change when this religion is majority or minority. 
In all tables, we observe no significant coefficient for Muslim in line with our previous 
finding that Muslims do not have a significantly different attitude toward corruption 
than Atheists. 
Thus these results are particularly interesting to appraise the relation between 
hierarchical Christian religions and tolerance to corruption. They show that this 
relation is influenced by the status of dominant religion. Interestingly, Catholics can 
be more tolerant toward corruption than Atheists when they represent the majority, 
and less averse when they are the minority, while the opposing view is observed for 
Orthodox. In other words, the status of minority religion would favor a greater or lower 
lenience toward corruption for individuals belonging to both these hierarchical 
Christian religions but in opposing directions. 
 
4.3 Multi-religious countries 
 
We prolong the in-depth investigation on the relation between religious 
denominations and corruption by considering specific countries in greater detail. WVS 
includes four countries which are characterized by multi-confessional environment in 
the sense that they are not dominated by one religion but rather see a coexistence of 
significant religious groups. These countries therefore provide relevant frameworks to 
analyze the influence of religious affiliations on attitude toward corruption since they 
allow comparing religions in the same institutional framework.  
We do not claim at all that the results in these countries can be generalized to all 
countries. The key idea of our investigation here is to provide additional investigation 
to check if our previous findings on the effect of religious denominations on corruption 
even stand for these multi-religious countries. These four countries are Germany, 
Malaysia, Lebanon, and Nigeria. 
Germany is historically a European country in which neither Catholics, nor 
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Protestants represent the overwhelming majority. In comparison with predominantly 
Catholic Southern European countries or mostly Protestant Northern European 
countries, Germany is therefore a country of prime interest to compare the behaviour 
of Catholics and Protestants. 
Table 7 reports the estimations for Germany. Interestingly we find evidence of a 
negative coefficient for both Catholic and Protestant, which is significant in some 
estimations. Hence the result of lower tolerance to corruption for Protestants relative 
to Atheists tends to be confirmed in Germany. At the same time, Germany shows no 
clear difference in behaviour toward corruption between Protestants and Catholics. 
Lebanon can be considered as a relevant country to compare the behaviour of 
Christians and Muslims. It has a very religiously diverse society with broadly speaking 
one half of the population belonging to Islam and one half of the population affiliating 
with Christian religions. Each half is not at all homogenous which creates the highest 
level of religious diversity in the Middle East. In our investigation, we will concentrate 
on the main religions we examine, i.e. Islam, Orthodox, Catholicism, and 
Protestantism, which are represented in Lebanon. 
Table 8 provides estimations for Lebanon. We observe significant and positive 
coefficients for all four religious denominations in all specifications. In other words, 
the different Christian religions and Islam are all associated with greater tolerance to 
corruption than Atheists in Lebanon.  
The Lebanese case gives us motives to qualify our main findings in the sense 
that they might not be universal. It is not in line with our former finding of negative 
relation for Protestantism and no significant relation for the three hierarchical 
religions. However, Lebanon appears to be a specific country in our sample of 
countries with findings obtained in this country which differ from the results on the 
full sample. Even for religiosity, the results differ with the fact that Pray is positive 
but not significant, while Attendance is significantly positive which means that greater 
frequency of attendance is associated with tolerance to corruption. All in all, all 
religions and religiosity are associated with lower aversion to corruption in Lebanon. 
Nigeria has similarities with Lebanon in the sense that the country is nearly 
equally divided between Islam and Christian religions. Each half is however not so 
heterogeneous than in Lebanon with the majority of Nigerian Muslims being Sunni, 
while Christians are divided between a majority of Protestants and a minority of 
Catholics (approximately one quarter of Christians). 
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Table 9 reports the results for Nigeria. We observe no significant coefficient for 
Protestant and Catholic, while the coefficient for Muslim is significantly negative. 
Thus, in Nigeria, Islam is associated with lower tolerance to corruption than for 
Atheism, while no significant relation is observed for both dominant Christian 
religions in the country. It therefore presents a different view than our cross-country 
estimations concluding to a negative relation for Protestantism and a non-significant 
one for Islam, even if the non-significant coefficient is still observed for Catholicism. 
Malaysia is a multicultural country with a Muslim majority and significant 
Buddhist and Hindu minorities. As such, Malaysia is of particular interest to compare 
Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Table 10 reports estimations for Malaysia. The 
coefficient of Buddhist is not significant, in line with the results on the full sample of 
countries. Muslim is positive but not significant in two of the three specifications. We 
therefore observe some limited support for the positive relation between Islam and 
tolerance to corruption, which differs from our conclusion on the full sample of 
countries. However, the main difference between Malaysia and the full sample of 
countries deals with Hinduism. While the coefficient for Hindu is significantly 
negative for all countries, it is significantly positive in Malaysia. 
But all findings on Malaysia should also be considered by taking into account 
the majority or minority status of each religious denomination. Namely Islam is the 
dominant religion, while Buddhism and especially Hinduism are practiced by 
minorities. Therefore, the observed results for Malaysia can be interpreted by this 
status. 
All in all, the estimations on multi-religious countries show that the main 
conclusions on the relation between religious denominations and tolerance to 
corruption are not necessarily observed in such countries. Hence they suggest 
moderating the view that universal findings could be observed for the impact of 
religious denominations on attitude toward corruption. They therefore add to the 
estimations by majority group in this perspective. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
 
We perform robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results. Since the 
main estimations have been performed with ordered probit model, we redo the 
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estimations in two ways. 
First, we estimate a probit model. To this end, we recode the dependent variable 
for tolerance to corruption as a dummy variable equal to one if Bribe is from 6 to 10 
and to zero if Bribe is from 1 to 5.  Table 11 displays the results. We observe the 
confirmation of our main findings. First, both religiosity variables are significantly 
negative in all estimations, supporting the conclusion that religious people have a 
lower tolerance to corruption. Second, we find the same negative association between 
being Protestant or Hindu and tolerance to corruption: Protestant and Hindu are 
significantly negative in all specifications.  
We observe one significantly positive coefficient for Catholic in one estimation, 
but it remains non-significant in two other estimations in line with our findings with 
the ordered probit model. We also point out now a negative relation between Buddhism 
and tolerance to corruption. While Buddhist was not significant in our main 
estimations, it is now significantly negative in all specifications. It therefore moderates 
our finding of no relation between Buddhism and tolerance to corruption. However, it 
strengthens our conclusion that individualistic religions have a more negative attitude 
toward corruption than hierarchical religions, in line with the view of Treisman (2000). 
Second, we estimate an OLS model. The variable for attitude to corruption is a 
variable on a scale from 1 to 10 so an ordered probit model is more appropriate than a 
model considering a continuous variable. Nonetheless, several former studies like 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) have performed OLS estimations with such 
variable. Table 12 reports the estimations. 
These additional regressions again confirm both our main findings. On the one 
hand, religiosity is negatively associated with tolerance to corruption. Coefficients for 
Pray and Attendance are significantly negative in all estimations. On the other hand, 
we again observe that Protestantism and Hinduism are associated with greater aversion 
toward corruption. For the rest, all coefficients for religious denominations are not 
significant in all estimations with one exception for Catholic in one specification. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study has examined the relation between religion and tolerance toward 
corruption. We have performed a cross-country investigation with World Values 
Survey data to check if religiosity and religious denominations are associated with 
attitude toward corruption. We obtain two main findings. 
First, religious people are more averse to corruption. This finding can be 
explained by the fact that religiosity favors honest behaviour or at least good social 
behaviour. In other words, to speak with Pope Francis’s words, corruption seems to be 
considered as evil by religious people. 
Second, attitudes toward corruption differ across religious denominations. 
Protestantism and Hinduism are associated with lower tolerance to corruption than 
Atheism, while other religions do not have clear difference. This conclusion accords 
with the view from Treisman (2000) that hierarchical religions (Catholicism, Orthodox 
Christianity, Islam) favor attitudes with respect for authority and thus diminish 
contestation of office-holders. As such, individualistic religions like Protestantism and 
Hinduism lead to lower tolerance to corruption. 
However, the influence of religious denomination cannot be considered as 
universal. The behaviour of individuals can be influenced by the fact that their religion 
is majority or minority. We observe that Catholics and Orthodox people do not have 
the same tolerance to corruption whether they live in a Catholic or an Orthodox 
country. We also find that the impact of religious denominations on attitude toward 
corruption varies with the religious environment through the comparison of results on 
four multi-religious countries. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on a general, 
global relation between religious denominations and attitude toward corruption. 
We therefore contribute to the identification of the determinants of corruption 
by showing that religiosity matters while religious denomination plays a role which 
can differ across countries. These findings also contribute to the literature on the 
influence of religion on economic outcomes by providing additional evidence that 
religion is not neutral. All in all, the main lesson from our investigation is that religion 
matters for institutions. As such it cannot be ignored in the debate on the causes of 
economic development, even for the advocates of the key role of institutions. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Observations 
Bribe 1.9700 1.9026 1 10 68,934 
Religious Denomination     
   Other 0.0829 0.2758 0 1 68,934 
   Atheist 0.1865 0.3895 0 1 68,934 
   Buddhist 0.0479 0.2136 0 1 68,934 
   Protestant 0.0968 0.2957 0 1 68,934 
   Hindu 0.0238 0.1525 0 1 68,934 
   Jew 0.0054 0.0731 0 1 68,934 
   Muslim 0.2719 0.4449 0 1 68,934 
   Orthodox 0.0976 0.2967 0 1 68,934 
   Catholic 0.1872 0.3901 0 1 68,934 
Attendance 3.9640 2.1812 1 7 68,934 
Pray 5.3263 2.6800 1 8 68,934 
Gender 0.4762 0.4994 0 1 68,934 
Age 41.96 16.53 16 98 68,934 
Education 5.7857 2.3356 1 9 68,934 
Income 4.9109 2.0936 1 10 68,934 
Health 2.0789 0.8445 1 4 68,934 
Tvnews 1.4531 0.9905 1 5 68,934 
Internet 3.2370 1.7818 1 5 68,934 
Marital Status 0.5533 0.4972 0 1 68,934 
Children 0.7028 0.4570 0 1 68,934 
 
Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-
Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.) (2014). World 
Values Survey: Round Six-Country-Pooled Datafile Version: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp, 2014, Madrid: JD 
Systems Institute.  
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Table 2 Main estimations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender 0.0819*** 0.0725*** 0.0851*** 0.0720*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Age -0.0072*** -0.0068*** -0.0071*** -0.0068*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education -0.0295*** -0.0290*** -0.0295*** -0.0289*** -0.0294*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Income 0.0406*** 0.0406*** 0.0409*** 0.0403*** 0.0406*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Health 0.0530*** 0.0525*** 0.0524*** 0.0526*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
Tvnews 0.0647*** 0.0624*** 0.0642*** 0.0627*** 0.0641*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Internet -0.0195*** -0.0195*** -0.0199*** -0.0194*** -0.0196*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Marital Status -0.0816*** -0.0801*** -0.0809*** -0.0802*** -0.0804*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Children 0.0291** 0.0322** 0.0297** 0.0317** 0.0294** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Other -0.1449***   -0.0813*** -0.1238*** 
 (0.0234)   (0.0242) (0.0243) 
Buddhist -0.0295   0.0128 -0.0182 
 (0.0309)   (0.0312) (0.0311) 
Protestant -0.1017***   -0.0332 -0.0790*** 
 (0.0214)   (0.0224) (0.0224) 
Hindu -0.1172**   -0.0534 -0.0985** 
 (0.0460)   (0.0463) (0.0461) 
Jew 0.0377   0.0802 0.0512 
 (0.0714)   (0.0717) (0.0715) 
Muslim -0.0347   0.0337 -0.0165 
 (0.0250)   (0.0259) (0.0256) 
Orthodox -0.0367   0.0242 -0.0187 
 (0.0254)   (0.0260) (0.0260) 
Catholic 0.0011   0.0606*** 0.0204 
 (0.0182)   (0.0191) (0.0192) 
Pray  -0.0276***  -0.0277***  
  (0.0023)  (0.0025)  
Attendance   -0.0126***  -0.0095*** 
   (0.0026)  (0.0028) 
Observations 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0627 0.0632 0.0625 0.0635 0.0628 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used 
are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 3 Main estimations with interaction terms 
 
 (1) (2) 
Religiosity measure Pray Attendance 
Gender 0.0741*** 0.0817*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0099) 
Age -0.0068*** -0.0072*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education -0.0285*** -0.0291*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Income 0.0400*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Health 0.0527*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
Tvnews 0.0628*** 0.0643*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Internet -0.0194*** -0.0192*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Marital Status -0.0794*** -0.0796*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Children 0.0320** 0.0293** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Other 0.0968* 0.1417*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0488) 
Buddhist 0.0915 0.1820*** 
 (0.0581) (0.0564) 
Protestant 0.0840 0.0379 
 (0.0576) (0.0526) 
Hindu 0.2969*** 0.1230 
 (0.0910) (0.0832) 
Jew 0.0269 0.1107 
 (0.1594) (0.1392) 
Muslim 0.2144*** 0.0448 
 (0.0394) (0.0370) 
Orthodox 0.1301*** 0.0500 
 (0.0429) (0.0473) 
Catholic 0.1426*** 0.0899** 
 (0.0412) (0.0387) 
Pray 0.0050  
 (0.0050)  
Attendance  0.0280*** 
  (0.0071) 
Other×Religiosity -0.0457*** -0.0763*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0109) 
Buddhist× Religiosity -0.0304*** -0.0696*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0141) 
Protestant× Religiosity -0.0356*** -0.0447*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0110) 
Hindu× Religiosity -0.0739*** -0.0693*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0174) 
Jew× Religiosity -0.0019 -0.0315 
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 (0.0307) (0.0367) 
Muslim× Religiosity -0.0461*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0084) 
Orthodox× Religiosity -0.0358*** -0.0360*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0117) 
Catholic× Religiosity -0.0293*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0093) 
Observations 68,934 68,934 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0639 0.0631 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used 
are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 4 Catholic countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other -0.1647***   -0.1203** -0.1577*** 
 (0.0552)   (0.0570) (0.0584) 
Buddhist -0.5133   -0.4766 -0.5048 
 (0.5283)   (0.5317) (0.5289) 
Protestant 0.0175   0.0622 0.0243 
 (0.0443)   (0.0465) (0.0476) 
Hindu -0.1434   -0.1265 -0.1398 
 (0.4177)   (0.4208) (0.4182) 
Jew 0.2802   0.2769 0.2837 
 (0.4240)   (0.4225) (0.4241) 
Muslim 0.0526   0.0967 0.0585 
 (0.0865)   (0.0875) (0.0875) 
Orthodox 0.3006**   0.3513*** 0.3067** 
 (0.1274)   (0.1279) (0.1284) 
Catholic 0.0510*   0.0848*** 0.0559* 
 (0.0306)   (0.0324) (0.0334) 
Pray  -
0.0169*** 
 
-0.0198***  
  (0.0054)  (0.0058)  
Attendance   -0.0026  -0.0026 
   (0.0059)  (0.0066) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,147 13,147 13,147 13,147 13,147 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0621 0.0615 0.0613 0.0624 0.0621 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used 
are presented in the Appendix. 
  
48 
 
Table 5 Orthodox Christian countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other -0.2686**   -0.2166 -0.2764** 
 (0.1335)   (0.1348) (0.1347) 
Buddhist 0.4247   0.4572 0.4195 
 (0.4659)   (0.4704) (0.4631) 
Protestant -0.0372   0.0125 -0.0461 
 (0.1259)   (0.1272) (0.1280) 
Hindu 0.1524   0.1702 0.1548 
 (0.6101)   (0.5878) (0.6088) 
Jew -0.1003   -0.0247 -0.1072 
 (0.3027)   (0.3077) (0.3018) 
Muslim 0.1009   0.1302 0.0971 
 (0.0766)   (0.0781) (0.0771) 
Orthodox -0.0901   -0.0482 -0.0968** 
 (0.0427)   (0.0457) (0.0460) 
Catholic -0.0880   -0.0298 -0.0976 
 (0.0819)   (0.0853) (0.0861) 
Pray  -0.0216***  -0.0183  
  (0.0067)  (0.0072)  
Attendance   -0.0060  0.0038 
   (0.0093)  (0.0101) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,317 7,317 7,317 7,317 7,317 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0478 0.0474 0.0469 0.0481 0.0478 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used 
are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 6 Muslim countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other -0.3423***   -0.2940*** -0.3392*** 
 (0.1078)   (0.1085) (0.1080) 
Buddhist -0.1841*   -0.1690 -0.1834* 
 (0.1086)   (0.1090) (0.1086) 
Protestant 0.1541   0.2338 0.1596 
 (0.1897)   (0.1866) (0.1899) 
Hindu 0.2542*   0.3181** 0.2574* 
 (0.1307)   (0.1317) (0.1308) 
Jew 0.9844***   1.0656*** 0.9862*** 
 (0.2055)   (0.2158) (0.2055) 
Muslim 0.0057   0.0842 0.0095 
 (0.0691)   (0.0701) (0.0695) 
Orthodox -0.0787   -0.0151 -0.0746 
 (0.0780)   (0.0789) (0.0785) 
Catholic -0.2082**   -0.1396 -0.2036** 
 (0.0990)   (0.0999) (0.0994) 
Pray  -0.0373***  -0.0399***  
  (0.0046)  (0.0046)  
Attendance   -0.0025  -0.0026 
   (0.0050)  (0.0050) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,411 17,411 17,411 17,411 17,411 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0413 0.0415 0.0397 0.0434 0.0413 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used 
are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 7 Germany 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other -0.2819   -0.2397 -0.3871 
 (0.3569)   (0.3614) (0.3526) 
Buddhist -3.8652***   -3.8704*** -4.0368*** 
 (0.1908)   (0.1899) (0.1903) 
Protestant -0.0895   -0.0667 -0.1507* 
 (0.0720)   (0.0823) (0.0827) 
Hindu -0.1803   -0.1763 -0.1999 
 (0.3867)   (0.3849) (0.3900) 
Jew 0.9804   0.9842 0.9674 
 (0.7095)   (0.7097) (0.7099) 
Muslim -0.5068**   -0.4601* -0.6353*** 
 (0.2225)   (0.2402) (0.2442) 
Orthodox 0.9353***   0.9699*** 0.8497*** 
 (0.2303)   (0.2361) (0.2373) 
Catholic -0.1578**   -0.1228 -0.2436** 
 (0.0801)   (0.0990) (0.0965) 
Pray  -0.0267*  -0.0119  
  (0.0139)  (0.0187)  
Attendance   -0.0024  0.0369 
   (0.0171)  (0.0228) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0244 0.0182 0.0172 0.0245 0.0251 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Definitions of all variables used are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 8 Lebanon 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Protestant 1.5804***   1.5927*** 1.6352*** 
 (0.2605)   (0.2650) (0.2816) 
Muslim 1.2559***   1.2584*** 1.3045*** 
 (0.1844)   (0.1848) (0.1940) 
Orthodox 1.2244***   1.2288*** 1.2186*** 
 (0.2081)   (0.2087) (0.2154) 
Catholic 0.9198***   0.9237*** 0.9087*** 
 (0.1951)   (0.1956) (0.2023) 
Pray  0.0137  0.0179  
  (0.0183)  (0.0187)  
Attendance   0.0786***  0.0998*** 
   (0.0208)  (0.0224) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0361 0.0154 0.0195 0.0363 0.0426 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Definitions of all variables used are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 9 Nigeria 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other -0.7617*   -0.7551* -0.8329** 
 (0.4423)   (0.4439) (0.4008) 
Protestant -0.1130   -0.1136 -0.0650 
 (0.0983)   (0.0985) (0.0989) 
Hindu -0.9213*   -0.8985* -1.0128** 
 (0.4821)   (0.5029) (0.4420) 
Jew -0.2573   -0.2572 -0.2210 
 (0.2558)   (0.2556) (0.2582) 
Muslim -0.3489***   -0.3512*** -0.3020** 
 (0.1001)   (0.1013) (0.1009) 
Orthodox -0.3405*   -0.3426* -0.2676 
 (0.1777)   (0.1781) (0.1777) 
Catholic -0.0680   -0.0674 -0.0196 
 (0.1030)   (0.1030) (0.1036) 
Pray  -0.0079  0.0056  
  (0.0269)  (0.0286)  
Attendance   -0.0813***  -0.0792*** 
   (0.0198)  (0.0202) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0158 0.0112 0.0142 0.0158 0.0186 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Definitions of all variables used are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 10 Malaysia 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Other 0.4409   0.4856 0.5398* 
 (0.2951)   (0.3062) (0.3034) 
Buddhist 0.2840   0.3241 0.3560 
 (0.2897)   (0.3010) (0.2971) 
Hindu 0.6945**   0.7609** 0.8161*** 
 (0.2998)   (0.3164) (0.3089) 
Muslim 0.4453   0.5199 0.5804** 
 (0.2849)   (0.3043) (0.2948) 
Pray  -0.0054  -0.02191*  
  (0.0171)  (0.0192)  
Attendance   -0.0396**  -0.0538*** 
   (0.0165)  (0.0171) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0083 0.0054 0.0068 0.0087 0.0107 
 
Ordered probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable 
Bribe. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are estimated by robust 
standard errors. Definitions of all variables used are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 11 Robustness checks with probit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender 0.0801*** 0.0754*** 0.0843*** 0.0730*** 0.0804*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Age -0.0048*** -0.0046*** -0.0048*** -0.0045*** -0.0047*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Education -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0291*** -0.0285*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Income 0.0495*** 0.0496*** 0.0500*** 0.0493*** 0.0496*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Health 0.0358*** 0.0357*** 0.0351*** 0.0356*** 0.0352*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Tvnews 0.0835*** 0.0819*** 0.0829*** 0.0820*** 0.0828*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Internet -0.0237*** -0.0237*** -0.0240*** -0.0234*** -0.0237*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Marital Status -0.0931*** -0.0932*** -0.0932*** -0.0913*** -0.0912*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
Children 0.0218 0.0252 0.0238 0.0230 0.0219 
 (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0234) 
Other -0.1621***   -0.1141*** -0.1317*** 
 (0.0362)   (0.0376) (0.0379) 
Buddhist -0.1107**   -0.0797 -0.0942* 
 (0.0561)   (0.0565) (0.0565) 
Protestant -0.1875***   -0.1361*** -0.1560*** 
 (0.0376)   (0.0391) (0.0393) 
Hindu -0.1868***   -0.1396** -0.1590** 
 (0.0674)   (0.0681) (0.0679) 
Jew 0.1702   0.2091* 0.1917 
 (0.1178)   (0.1180) (0.1180) 
Muslim -0.0196   0.0322 0.0066 
 (0.0404)   (0.0418) (0.0415) 
Orthodox -0.0412   0.0045 -0.0155 
 (0.0440)   (0.0451) (0.0451) 
Catholic 0.0073   0.0518* 0.0342 
 (0.0299)   (0.0314) (0.0316) 
Pray  -0.0231***  -0.0212***  
  (0.0038)  (0.0041)  
Attendance   -0.0175***  -0.0133*** 
   (0.0043)  (0.0047) 
Observations 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.1606 0.1599 
0.1593 
0.1614 
0.1608 
 
Probit model estimations. The dependent variable is the dummy variable equal to one 
if Bribe is from 6 to 10 (high values) and zero if Bribe is from 1 to 5 (low values). *, 
**, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed effects are included. All regressions 
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are estimated by robust standard errors. Definitions of all variables used are presented 
in the Appendix. 
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Table 12 Robustness checks with ols 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gender 0.1020*** 0.0925*** 0.1083*** 0.0908*** 0.1033*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Age -0.0075*** -0.0071*** -0.0075*** -0.0071*** -0.0075*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education -0.0388*** -0.0386*** -0.0390*** -0.0382*** -0.0387*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Income 0.0561*** 0.0561*** 0.0566*** 0.0556*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Health 0.0683*** 0.0682*** 0.0680*** 0.0678*** 0.0679*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
Tvnews 0.1046*** 0.1024*** 0.1042*** 0.1026*** 0.1040*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Internet -0.0281*** -0.0278*** -0.0284*** -0.0278*** -0.0282*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Marital Status -0.1180*** -0.1176*** -0.1182*** -0.1166*** -0.1167*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Children 0.0309 0.0353* 0.0323 0.0341* 0.0313 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Other -0.2299***   -0.1554*** -0.2064*** 
 (0.0366)   (0.0378) (0.0377) 
Buddhist -0.0502   -0.0024 -0.0383 
 (0.0427)   (0.0431) (0.0429) 
Protestant -0.1783***   -0.1017*** -0.1533*** 
 (0.0301)   (0.0316) (0.0317) 
Hindu -0.2711***   -0.1992** -0.2510*** 
 (0.0875)   (0.0879) (0.0874) 
Jew 0.1136   0.1583 0.1281 
 (0.1083)   (0.1087) (0.1084) 
Muslim -0.0352   0.0403 -0.0158 
 (0.0413)   (0.0423) (0.0418) 
Orthodox -0.0568   0.0135 -0.0369 
 (0.0362)   (0.0373) (0.0371) 
Catholic -0.0075   0.0596** 0.0135 
 (0.0265)   (0.0278) (0.0278) 
Pray  -0.0322***  -0.0302***  
  (0.0031)  (0.0034)  
Attendance   -0.0162***  -0.0101*** 
   (0.0035)  (0.0038) 
Observations 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 68,934 
R-squared 0.1597 0.1598 0.1588 0.1607 0.1598 
 
OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the ordinal variable Bribe. *, **, *** 
denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated by robust standard errors. 
Country fixed effects are included. Definitions of all variables used are presented in 
the Appendix. 
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Appendix 
Definitions of variables 
 
Name Definition 
Dependent variable 
Bribe Ordinal variable based on response to the question: Please tell me 
for the following action whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: someone 
accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. Scoring from 1 
(never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). 
Independent variables 
Gender Dummy variable equals to one if the individual is a male and zero 
otherwise. 
Age The number of years that the respondents have lived. 
Education Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 9 with 
higher values indicates more education (1: No formal education, 
2: Incomplete primary school, 3: Complete primary school, 4: 
Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 5: 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 6: 
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type, 7: 
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type, 8: Some 
university-level education, without a degree, 9: University-level 
education, with degree) to the statement: What is the highest 
educational level that you have attained?  
Income Self-reported level of income of the respondent relative to his 
country. It is based on the question: On this card is an income 
scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the 
highest income group in your country. We would like to know in 
what group your household is? The figure reported ranges from 1 
for lowest decile to 10 for highest income decile. 
Health Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 4 with 
higher values represents worse state of health to the statement: All 
in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? 
Would you say it is:  1: very good, 2: good, 3: fair, 4: poor.  We 
reversed this variable so that higher values indicate better state of 
health.  
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Television Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 5 with 
higher values indicates less frequent use of internet to obtain 
information to the statement: People learn what is going on in this 
country and the world from various sources. For television, please 
indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, 
monthly, less than monthly or never.  We reversed this variable so 
that higher values indicate more frequent use of televison to obtain 
information. 
Internet Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 5 
(higher values indicate less frequent use of internet to obtain 
information)to the statement: People learn what is going on in this 
country and the world from various sources. For internet, please 
indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, 
monthly, less than monthly or never.  We reversed this variable so 
that higher values indicate more frequent use of internet to obtain 
information.  
Catholic Dummy variable equal to one if individual declares he or she 
belongs to Catholic religion and zero otherwise. 
Protestant Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Protestant religion and zero otherwise. 
Orthodox Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Orthodox religion and zero otherwise. 
Muslim Dummy variable equals to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Catholic religion and zero otherwise. 
Jew Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Jewish religion and zero otherwise. 
Hindu Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Hindu religion and zero otherwise. 
Buddhist Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
belongs to Buddhist religion and zero otherwise. 
No religion Dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares he or she 
does not belong to any religion and zero otherwise. 
Other  Dummy variable equal to one for all the other religious 
denominations with a small number of respondents. 
Pray Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 7 with 
higher values of this variable represents less frequency of pray (1: 
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More than once a week, 2: Once a week, 3: Once a month, 4: Only 
on special holy days, 5: Once a year, 6: Less often, 7: Never, 
practically never) to the statement: “Apart from weddings and 
funerals, about how often do you pray?”. We reversed this 
variable so that higher values indicate more frequency of pray.  
Attendance Dummy variable based on the response on a scale from 1 to 7 with 
higher values of this variable represents less frequency of 
religious attendance (1: More than once a week, 2: Once a week, 
3: Once a month, 4: Only on special holy days, 5: Once a year, 6: 
Less often, 7: Never, practically never) to the statement: “Apart 
from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days?”.  We reversed this variable so that 
higher values indicate more frequency of religious attendance. 
 
Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-
Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.) (2014). World 
Values Survey: Round Six-Country-Pooled Datafile Version: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp, Madrid: JD 
Systems Institute.  
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Abstract 
 
We use four ways of the European Social Survey, covering 2000 to 2008, to analyze 
the effect of religion on happiness. Our findings confirm that religious individuals are 
generally happier than non-religious ones. When we seek to disentangle the effects of 
belonging to an organized religion from the effect of holding religious beliefs, we find 
that the former lowers happiness while the latter raises it. We interpret this as evidence 
that the tangible aspects of religion (such as abiding by restrictions on consumption 
and behaviour) decrease happiness while the spiritual aspects increase it. We also find 
important differences among members of different religious denominations, and 
between men and women, with females more adversely affected by the tangible 
aspects of belonging to a religion.  
 
Keywords: religion, happiness.  
JEL Codes: I31, Z12 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although there are many empirical studies that examine the relationship between 
happiness (or subjective wellbeing) and various economic indicators1, relatively few 
focus on the effects of religion on happiness2. Those that do tend to find a robustly 
positive effect (see for example; Deaton and Stone, 2013, and the references therein)3. 
Clark and Lelkes (2009) and Dehejia, DeLeire and Luttmer (2005) find that being a 
member of a religion not only increases overall happiness but it also serves to protect 
believers against adverse shocks such as a drop in income or incidence of 
unemployment. Moreover, Clark and Lelkes (2009) find that the positive effect of 
religion is not limited to the believers: the reported happiness of religious and non-
religious people alike is positively correlated with the average religious activity in the 
respondents’ region. Mookerjee and Beron (2005) consider the role of religious 
fragmentation and find that higher levels of religious diversity decrease the level of 
happiness. Finally, Campante and Yanagizawa and Drott (2013) show that even costly 
religious sacrifices, such as fasting during the Ramadan, can raise subjective well-
being.  
In this paper, we seek to decompose the effect of religion on happiness into two 
components: the benefits – both material and spiritual – and the costs, in particular the 
need to comply with the various rules and restrictions imposed by religion. On the side 
of the benefits, being a member of a religion yields a range of tangible benefits, such 
as social contacts (including access to potential spouses and matchmaking), emotional 
and material support in times of need, dispute resolution, as well as immaterial and 
spiritual benefits such the prospect of eternal life in heaven, favorable reincarnation 
and the like.  
Religious membership is also costly as religions typically bring with them 
complex rules such as basic tenets of one’s behaviour (for example the Ten 
Commandments in Christianity or the hadith in Islam), restrictions on what foods one 
                                                          
1 See for example Di Tella, McCulloch and Oswald (2001) for inflation and unemployment, Clark, 
Georgellis and Sanfey (2001) for labor market outcomes, Easterlin (1995, 2001) for income and Oswald 
(1997) for economic performance. For literature review, see Dolan, Peasgood and White (2008).  
2 Most of the early empirical analyses on the impact of the religion on happiness have been done by 
psychologists: see Diener et al. (1999) for a literature review. 
3 Other studies that find a positive effect of religion on happiness in a broad range of countries and 
contexts include Soydemir, Bastida and Gonzales (2004), Mochon, Norton and Ariely (2008), Tao 
(2008), Lelkes (2006), Easterlin (2009), Florea and Caudill (2014) and Popova (2014).  
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can eat, what constitutes acceptable clothing, under what circumstances men and 
women can meet, which aspects of modern technology can be embraced, and even 
invasive and painful actions and body modifications such as self-flagellation or male 
and female genital circumcision (mutilation). Berman (2000) explains such restrictions 
by likening religions to clubs that offer benefits (club goods) and require costly 
sacrifices (membership dues) to prevent freeriding.  
However, while the tangible benefits of religion may have been important in the 
past, they have lost much of their importance in modern societies with well-
functioning secular institutions providing the legal system, health care, redistributive 
transfers, counseling, and the like. Furthermore, modern science increasingly 
undermines also the immaterial benefits of religion. As the relative benefits of being a 
member of a religion decline, the relative cost of complying with religious restrictions 
should rise. At the same time, the rising complexity of modern societies and the rapidly 
growing range of consumption options make complying with religious prescriptions 
increasingly costly or even ambiguous4. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect religion 
to play less of a role in people’s lives. Indeed, Paldam and Grundlach (2010) 
hypothesize an inverse relationship between religiosity and the level of economic 
development, which they confirm using World Values Survey data for a broad range 
of countries.  
In our analysis, we use the first four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), 
collected between 2000 and 2008, to address these issues. These surveys allow us to 
control for membership in a broad range of major religions: given that the benefits and 
restrictions associated with different religions are not the same, it is reasonable to 
expect their effect on happiness not to be the same. In addition to religious 
membership, we also control for the intensity of religious devotion, which we interpret 
as a proxy for the immaterial aspects of religion, and participation in religious 
activities. 
Our results suggest that, when controlling for religious affiliation, membership 
in most major religions is associated with significantly greater happiness after 
controlling for a broad range of individual-level characteristics. When we add 
                                                          
4 For example, most Old World religions do not ban tobacco because it was only introduced from the 
Americas relatively late, long after those religions formulated their religious restrictions. Given its 
addictive properties and harmful health effects, it would be reasonable to expect at least some religions 
to ban the use of tobacco if they were to revise their rules or formulate then anew.  
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religiosity and allow its effect to vary across religions, a striking result emerges: 
religious membership lowers happiness but this is countered by a positive effect of 
religiosity. We interpret the effect of religious membership as capturing the tangible 
aspects of religion (both costs and benefits) while religiosity reflects the immaterial 
aspects. Our results therefore suggest that membership in a religion is costly but this 
is compensated by the spiritual and immaterial benefits for those who are sufficiently 
devoted. We also observe important differences across religions in this respect. 
Finally, when we replace religiosity by the frequency of praying, this dichotomous 
pattern disappears, suggesting that it is really the intensity of beliefs and not 
participation in religious activities that increases happiness.  
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008), Clark and Lelkes (2009) and others have 
considered the differences across religious denominations in their impact on 
happiness. Deaton and Stone (2013), in turn, consider religiosity rather than 
membership of a religion, which in their analysis is a dichotomous variable (yes/no 
answer to a question whether religion plays an important role in one’s life). Our 
religiosity variables measure the intensity of beliefs on a 0-10 scale, thus allowing for 
much greater differentiation in the degree of religious devotion. Furthermore, to the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to control for religious membership and 
intensity of religiosity at the same time, while allowing for differences across religious 
denominations, so as to differentiate between the material (tangible) and spiritual 
aspects of religion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce our data 
set and the variables we use in the empirical analysis. In section 3, we discuss our 
empirical results and in the last section, we summarize and discuss our findings.   
 
2. Data 
 
The analysis is based on the first four waves of the European Social Survey 
(European Social Survey, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008) (ESS henceforth) carried out every 
two years between 2000 and 2008 in 30 countries in Europe and its neighborhood: 
besides the EU/EEA countries, Turkey, Russia and Israel are also included. While the 
surveys are carried out in the same countries repeatedly, the data takes the form of 
repeated cross-sections rather than a panel. The dependent variable collects the 
respondents’ responses to a standard happiness question:  
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“Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” 
The answers are coded between 0 (extremely unhappy) and 10 (extremely 
happy). Religiosity is measured by a question on the intensity of respondents’ 
devotion, coded also between 0 (not at all religious) and 10 (very religious). We also 
consider participation in religious activities, which we measure by how often 
respondents pray, ranging between 1 (every day) and 7 (never). As for membership in 
major religious denominations, we have information whether the respondents are 
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Islamic, 
Eastern, or belong to any other (non-Christian) religions. The basic statistics for all 
countries and for all four waves are summarized in Table 1.  
A non-negligible share of respondents in virtually every country declared no 
religious denomination (with the exceptions of Turkey, Greece, Poland and Israel in 
which more than 90% of respondents identify with a religion). The share of unaffiliated 
respondents is reported also in Table 1 in the column denoted as None. In a number of 
countries (France, Sweden, the UK, the Czech Republic and Estonia), more than two-
thirds of respondents report no religious denomination. While we do not know for sure 
what it means when a respondent fails to report a religious affiliation, we interpret this 
as an indication that these respondents are not very religious and that they are unlikely 
to comply with religious restrictions. Indeed, the five countries with especially high 
shares of non-affiliated respondents all have average religiosity below 45. 
The last column reports the average happiness. The happiest place in Europe is 
Denmark while the gloomiest country is Bulgaria. Turkey wins on religiosity and the 
least God-fearing place in Europe is the Czech Republic.  
 
3. Does Religion Raise Happiness?  
 
Since the dependent variable, happiness, takes values from 0 to 10 (with 
increasing values representing more happiness), we use ordered logit to study the 
determinants of happiness. We control for a broad range of individual socio-economic 
                                                          
5 29 percent of respondents without a religious denomination report their religiosity to be 0, the median 
religiosity is 3 and only 1 percent reports the highest possible value, 10. Among respondents belonging 
to a religion, 2 percent say they are not at all religious (reporting 0), the median is 6 and 9 percent report 
being very religious (10 out of 10). Similarly, 7 percent of respondents without a religious denomination 
say they pray every day while 64 percent never pray. Among those with a religious denomination, 34 
percent pray every day and 15 percent never.  
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characteristics: gender (we also estimate separate regressions for males and females to 
allow the individual variables to have gender-specific effect on happiness), age, 
education, household composition and marital status, degree of urbanization, relative 
income6 and labor-market status, in addition to religiosity and religious denomination. 
The regression results for this baseline specification are reported in Table 2, with 
country and ESS-wave effects included but not reported.  
Our regressions reproduce a number of well-known findings. Men are less happy 
than women. Education increases happiness (even after controlling for relative income 
and labor-market status). The effect of age is non-linear, with middle-aged individuals 
being less happy than either young or old ones (men attain lowest happiness aged 58, 
women at 60). Having a larger household increases happiness but children reduce it 
(after controlling for household size). Married individuals are happier. Rural residents 
are happier than urban folks. Being well-off gives a powerful boost to happiness. 
Finally, students are generally happy whereas the unemployed, sick/disabled and 
retirees are unhappy. As for belonging to an organized religion, we identify happiness-
boosting effects for all religions except the Eastern Orthodox. These results suggest 
that religious people are significantly happier than non-religious individuals.  
Considering men and women separately reveals a few gender-specific 
differences. The positive effect of education is more than double that for women as for 
men. The same goes for the (negative) effect of having children. Women’s happiness 
is also more affected by relative income. As for religion, Jewish and Muslim women 
gain substantially more from belonging to a religion than males.  
Our main results are presented in Table 3 where we add religiosity, both as a 
stand-alone determinant of happiness and interacted with the various religious 
denominations. The regressions include the same broad range of socio-economic 
characteristics as in Table 2, but to save space, we are not reporting these (the estimated 
coefficients are very similar to those in Table 2). As we argued above, this allows us 
to distinguish between the material and spiritual aspects of religion, the former 
captured by membership of a religion while the latter are measured by the intensity of 
religious beliefs. The effect of adding religiosity is striking: belonging to a religion 
                                                          
6 Rather than use absolute income, which is difficult to compare across countries at different level of 
economic development due to differences in purchasing power, we use the question asking the 
respondents how well they are faring with their income, ranging from being comfortable to finding it 
very difficult to cope.  
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now reduces rather than increases happiness, significantly so for Protestants, Roman 
Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and Muslims. This is countered by happiness-boosting 
effect of religiosity: on its own and also through the interaction terms. In other words, 
being a member of a religion appears to lower happiness (possibly because of the 
restrictions on behaviour and consumption); the increased happiness stems from 
religious devotion rather than from membership in a religion itself. Moreover, the 
happiness-boosting effect of religious devotion is not the same across the various 
religions, as the significant coefficients of the interaction terms demonstrate.  
One way to assess the counteracting effects of religious affiliation and religiosity 
is to consider how religious a person has to be so that religion has no effect on 
happiness7. Since the reference category is individuals who report no religious 
denomination, this exercise will yield the level of religiosity when a member of a 
particular religion is as happy as a person without a declared religion. For Roman 
Catholics, this zero-happiness religiosity is 3.1 when taking all respondents together, 
2.7 for men and 3.7 for women (recall that religiosity takes values from 0 to 10). 
Protestants are even better off: 1.4 overall, 0.7 for men and 2 for women. For Eastern 
Orthodox, the zero-happiness point is higher: 4 overall, 3.6 for men and 4.6 for women; 
2.6 for other Christians (1.3 for men and 3.7 for women); 0.9 for Jews (2.2 for men 
and 0.1 for women); and 4.3 for Muslims (4.6 for men and 4.3 for women). Hence, 
while for some religious denominations, even a mildly religious person can experience 
no negative effect on happiness, for others one must be at least moderately religious.  
In Table 4, we replace religiosity with an indicator how often the respondent 
prays: note that increasing values of this variable indicate praying less often. Again, 
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents are included but not reported. The 
effects of religious denominations now appear mixed: some are positive while others 
are negative or insignificant. Hence, adding the frequency of religious activities does 
not have the same effect as controlling for the intensity of religious beliefs. This is 
possibly because the frequency of praying is one of the restrictions imposed by some 
religions and, as such, need not reflect the intensity of religious beliefs. Furthermore, 
most of the interaction terms are insignificant. The coefficient on praying is strongly 
significant: the negative sign implies that praying more often increases happiness. The 
                                                          
7 For this, we divide the coefficient for religious denomination (in absolute value) by the sum of the 
coefficient on the interaction effect and that of religiosity on its own). For example, for Roman 
Catholics, the calculation is 0.30224/(0.055686+0.042264)=3.08.  
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fact that most of the interaction terms are insignificant, however, suggests that the 
effect of praying on happiness is largely uniform across all religions.  
Next, we present a number of robustness checks. In Tables 5-7, we replace the 
indicator of happiness (which takes values between 0 and 10) with a dummy variable 
equal to one if the respondent reports happiness level of 9 or 10 and zero otherwise. 
This means that we only consider the very happy respondents. An additional advantage 
is that this allows us to report marginal effects, unlike in the previous Tables. Table 5 
presents the results with only religious denominations, Table 6 adds religiosity and 
Table 7 adds praying. The results are qualitatively very similar to those reported above. 
Finally, in Tables 8-10, we estimate the regressions using OLS rather than logit or 
ordered logit. While this is not an appropriate method to analyze categorical variables, 
the dependent variable is close to being continuous, taking 11 different values (0-10). 
Again, a useful byproduct of using this technique is that we can compare the magnitude 
of the various effects more easily. The results are once more very similar to those in 
Tables 2-4.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our results confirm the previous finding that religion increases happiness. In our 
analysis, we seek to disentangle the tangible aspects of membership in an organized 
religion from the more abstract effects of religiosity: the former reflecting the club 
goods provided by religious congregations as well as the various religious restrictions 
while the latter being essentially spiritual. When doing so, we find that religious 
membership without religious devotion lower happiness. It is the spiritual and belief-
based aspect of religion, as captured by the intensity of religious attachment, which 
raises happiness. Differences between men and women are non-negligible, with 
women being both more negatively affected by religious membership and gaining 
more due to religiosity. Differences across religious denominations are important too. 
In contrast, although praying frequently also raises happiness, this effect does not vary 
much across the various religions.  
Hence, belonging to a religion and abiding by its rules is costly. Religious 
people’s happiness stems from the intensity of their beliefs, not from tangible benefits 
associated with religious membership.   
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Table 1 Religiosity and happiness in Europe 
 
Variable 
[Scale] 
Roman 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Eastern 
Orthodox 
Other 
Christian  
Jewish Islamic 
Eastern 
religions 
Other  None 
Religious 
[0-10] 
Pray 
[1-7] 
Happy 
[0-10] 
Austria 62.1% 3.4% 0.7% 1.1% 0.1% 1.3% 0.9% 0.3% 30.1% 5.10 4.35 7.5 
Belgium 39.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.1% 3.0% 0.3% 0.4% 55.4% 4.80 5.22 7.7 
Bulgaria 0.3% 0.5% 50.3% 0.6% 0.0% 10.9% 0.0% 0.1% 37.2% 4.33 5.09 5.3 
Switzerland 31.6% 30.1% 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 2.4% 0.8% 0.4% 32.4% 5.28 4.06 8.0 
Cyprus 0.5% 0.0% 69.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 30.2% 6.89 2.85 7.5 
Czech Rep. 23.1% 1.9% 0.1% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 73.5% 2.65 6.03 6.7 
Germany 22.3% 27.8% 0.6% 1.5% 0.1% 2.0% 0.4% 0.1% 45.1% 3.91 5.17 7.2 
Denmark 1.0% 56.2% 0.1% 0.8% 0.1% 1.5% 0.3% 0.3% 39.6% 4.23 5.63 8.3 
Estonia 0.5% 7.6% 14.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 76.0% 3.55 5.94 6.6 
Spain 68.4% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.1% 0.2% 27.8% 4.49 4.60 7.5 
Finland 0.1% 49.2% 0.9% 0.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 48.7% 5.32 4.56 8.0 
France 26.6% 1.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 2.1% 0.1% 0.2% 69.1% 3.70 5.45 7.1 
UK 5.6% 19.5% 0.1% 1.0% 0.2% 1.4% 0.9% 0.3% 71.1% 4.17 4.90 7.4 
Greece 0.8% 0.3% 89.5% 0.2% 0.0% 1.9% 0.1% 0.1% 7.2% 6.87 2.78 6.5 
Croatia 75.4% 0.2% 3.8% 0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 19.6% 6.14 3.29 6.7 
Hungary 34.6% 12.7% 0.0% 1.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 51.2% 4.33 4.81 6.3 
Ireland 76.5% 2.8% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 18.6% 5.52 2.85 7.6 
Israel 2.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 72.5% 14.3% 0.1% 1.0% 9.3% 4.82 4.65 7.4 
Italy 78.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 20.8% 6.06 3.71 6.3 
Luxembourg 51.9% 0.9% 0.5% 16.1% 0.1% 1.6% 0.4% 0.4% 28.0% 4.29 5.12 7.8 
Netherlands 20.1% 16.4% 0.2% 2.9% 0.1% 2.0% 0.6% 0.3% 57.4% 4.94 4.83 7.7 
Norway 1.3% 47.9% 0.3% 1.7% 0.0% 1.3% 0.4% 0.8% 46.2% 3.92 5.43 7.9 
Poland 90.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 7.8% 6.43 2.68 6.9 
Portugal 83.5% 0.8% 0.2% 1.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 13.2% 5.69 3.36 6.5 
Russia 0.3% 0.2% 48.4% 0.2% 0.1% 5.5% 0.1% 0.0% 45.2% 4.47 4.99 6.0 
Sweden 1.1% 26.1% 0.5% 1.2% 0.1% 1.4% 0.3% 0.2% 69.0% 3.54 5.78 7.9 
Slovenia 50.2% 0.9% 1.3% 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 0.1% 0.1% 46.2% 4.75 4.99 7.2 
Slovakia 63.5% 7.8% 0.7% 5.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 22.4% 5.96 3.74 6.5 
Turkey 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 96.1% 0.0% 1.1% 2.7% 7.07 1.79 6.0 
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Ukraine 8.2% 1.4% 60.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.5% 27.8% 5.16 3.80 5.5 
Average  29.6% 12.6% 10.2% 1.3% 2.3% 3.6% 0.3% 0.3% 39.8% 4.82 4.51 7.1 
 
Notes: The answers to the questions on generalized trust, perceived fairness and helpfulness (columns 1-3) range between 0 and 10. 
Meeting people socially takes values 1 through 7. Having someone to discuss personal/intimate matters takes values 0 and 1. Participating 
in social activities takes values 1 through 5. Higher values always indicate higher stock of social capital. Religiosity ranges from Not at 
all religious (0) to Very religious (10). Praying ranges from Every day (1) to Never (7).  
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). ESS Wave-1, ESS Wave-2, ESS Wave-3, ESS Wave-4,   
www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
   
 
73 
 
Table 2 Religion and happiness: ordered logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Male -0.1302***   
 (0.0091)   
Age -0.05606*** -0.06423*** -0.04977*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0022) 
Age sqrd 0.000476*** 0.000555*** 0.000412*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education years 0.012345*** 0.007303*** 0.015556*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Household size 0.039875*** 0.039898*** 0.039645*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0059) 
Children -0.04542*** -0.03951** -0.06664*** 
(dummy) (0.0123) (0.0191) (0.0163) 
Married/cohabitating 0.640778*** 0.730828*** 0.559753*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0175) (0.0145) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.03134* -0.03087 -0.03488 
 (0.0161) (0.0237) (0.0218) 
Town(1) 0.018864 0.017407 0.016346 
 (0.0126) (0.0189) (0.0170) 
Village(1) 0.061427*** 0.07757*** 0.046836*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0192) (0.0174) 
Farm/countryside(1) 0.110451*** 0.133829*** 0.095133*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0307) (0.0299) 
Income: coping(2) -0.47535*** -0.50669*** -0.45724*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0158) (0.0153) 
Income: difficult(2) -1.11935*** -1.15606*** -1.09804*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0223) (0.0201) 
Income: v. 
difficult(2) -1.81038*** -1.90935*** -1.74006*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0338) (0.0279) 
Paid work(3) -0.03811*** 0.05047* -0.09597*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0277) (0.0184) 
Student(3) 0.181319*** 0.277164*** 0.101601*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0320) (0.0267) 
Unemployed(3) -0.38571*** -0.41158*** -0.32436*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0407) (0.0356) 
Inactive(3) -0.27345*** -0.26756*** -0.24929*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0533) (0.0436) 
Sick/disabled(3) -0.57207*** -0.50233*** -0.61936*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0430) (0.0372) 
Retired(3) -0.00721 0.063356* -0.0641*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0333) (0.0243) 
Homeworker(3) 0.073006*** 0.070782*** 0.083989*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0221) (0.0151) 
Roman Catholic(4) 0.141687*** 0.181401**** 0.11059*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0178) 
Protestant(4) 0.193347*** 0.194028*** 0.182532*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0218) (0.0201) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.02894 0.040285 -0.06807** 
 (0.0244) (0.0378) (0.0323) 
Other Christian(4) 0.249879*** 0.321205*** 0.189769*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0584) (0.0518) 
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Jewish(4) 0.231532*** 0.10846 0.326169*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0862) (0.0809) 
Muslim(4) 0.204344*** 0.152294*** 0.242279*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0537) (0.0558) 
Foreign born -0.05245*** 0.002987 -0.09593*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0253) (0.0223) 
Ethnic minority -0.12348*** -0.15419*** -0.09827*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0321) (0.0302) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or other 
non-Christian affiliation. 
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Table 3 Religiosity and happiness: ordered logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) -0.30224*** -0.2602*** -0.39136*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0368) (0.0372) 
Protestant(4) -0.11753*** -0.04722 -0.18244*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0443) (0.0473) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.32665*** -0.32238*** -0.38827*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0705) (0.0660) 
Other Christian(4) -0.22573** -0.10633 -0.36959** 
 (0.1084) (0.1531) (0.1550) 
Jewish(4) -0.07145 -0.16804 0.007617 
 (0.0786) (0.1172) (0.1065) 
Muslim(4) -0.67239*** -0.6822*** -0.69608*** 
 (0.0806) (0.1081) (0.1226) 
Roman 
Catholic*R(5) 0.055686*** 0.061293*** 0.062125*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0065) (0.0060) 
Protestant*R(5) 0.040733*** 0.032749*** 0.047246*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0077) 
East Orthodox*R(5) 0.038494*** 0.054914*** 0.04072*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0113) (0.0097) 
Other 
Christian*R(5) 0.045605*** 0.044144** 0.054942*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0218) (0.0205) 
Jewish*R(5) 0.041646*** 0.038931** 0.045242*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0174) (0.0145) 
Muslim*R(5) 0.113159*** 0.113268*** 0.118462*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0152) (0.0162) 
Religiosity (R) 0.042264*** 0.035709*** 0.043844*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0035) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or other 
non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and religiosity. 
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Table 4 Pray and happiness: ordered logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) 0.052841* 0.135342*** 0.049935 
 (0.0291) (0.0501) (0.0362) 
Protestant(4) 0.145429*** 0.125054** 0.146224*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0587) (0.0413) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.17459*** -0.03507 -0.18247*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0742) (0.0524) 
Other Christian(4) 0.181232*** 0.265262** 0.159717* 
 (0.0653) (0.1077) (0.0827) 
Jewish(4) 0.480763*** 0.224887 0.699911*** 
 (0.0933) (0.1382) (0.1275) 
Muslim(4) 0.115803* 0.086141 0.143069* 
 (0.0600) (0.0874) (0.0842) 
Roman 
Catholic*P(5) 0.002003 -0.00867 -0.00329 
 (0.0052) (0.0084) (0.0069) 
Protestant*P(5) -0.0031 0.001271 -0.00399 
 (0.0061) (0.0100) (0.0081) 
East Orthodox*P(5) 0.022463*** 0.004944 0.016763 
 (0.0080) (0.0131) (0.0107) 
Other Christian*P(5) -0.01482 -0.01898 -0.02535 
 (0.0167) (0.0244) (0.0239) 
Jewish*P(5) -0.06486*** -0.04136* -0.08691*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0229) (0.0203) 
Muslim*P(5) -0.00294 -0.01566 0.008793 
 (0.0128) (0.0181) (0.0183) 
Pray (P) -0.03853*** -0.04299*** -0.03151*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0065) (0.0049) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or other 
non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and pray. 
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Table 5 Religion and happiness (happiness>=9): Logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Male -0.03343***   
 (0.0022)   
Age -0.01087*** -0.01189*** -0.01007*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Age sqrd 0.000095*** 0.000105*** 8.63E-05*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education years -0.00093*** -0.00156*** -0.00059 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Household size 0.006939*** 0.005461*** 0.008154*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
Children -0.0014 -0.00273 -0.00268 
(dummy) (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0041) 
Married/cohabitating 0.110419*** 0.120762*** 0.100566*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0037) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.00487 -0.01026* -0.00065 
 (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0055) 
Town(1) 0.005503* 0.004242*** 0.005811 
 (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0044) 
Village(1) 0.014228*** 0.017455*** 0.010692** 
 (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0045) 
Farm/countryside(1) 0.022897*** 0.020866*** 0.02586*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Income: coping(2) -0.0931*** -0.09175*** -0.09533*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
Income: difficult(2) -0.1668*** -0.15411*** -0.17795*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0050) 
Income: v. 
difficult(2) -0.20589*** -0.19862*** -0.21214*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0093) (0.0076) 
Paid work(3) -0.01491*** -0.00222 -0.0233*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0045) 
Student(3) 0.011303** 0.021952*** 0.002228 
 (0.0047) (0.0075) (0.0064) 
Unemployed(3) -0.04572*** -0.05069*** -0.03866*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0108) (0.0093) 
Inactive(3) -0.03464*** -0.01867 -0.04428*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0140) (0.0116) 
Sick/disabled(3) -0.04716*** -0.02721** -0.06346*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0101) 
Retired(3) 0.007335 0.016364** -0.00095 
 (0.0047) (0.0081) (0.0061) 
Homeworker(3) 0.015536*** 0.013701*** 0.018819*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0037) 
Roman Catholic(4) 0.018261*** 0.022203*** 0.015169*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0044) 
Protestant(4) 0.031896*** 0.032259*** 0.030469*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0047) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.00212 0.009142 -0.00715 
 (0.0069) (0.0102) (0.0093) 
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Other Christian(4) 0.056861*** 0.058636*** 0.055063*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0122) 
Jewish(4) 0.017685 -0.01466 0.044729** 
 (0.0131) (0.0189) (0.0183) 
Muslim(4) 0.026786*** 0.012962 0.037573*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0134) 
Foreign born 0.004354 0.017746*** -0.00655 
 (0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0055) 
Ethnic minority -0.00412 -0.00354 -0.0049 
 (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0077) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. 
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Table 6 Religiosity and happiness (happiness>=9): Logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual 
Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) -0.07498*** -0.05794*** -0.09817*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0096) 
Protestant(4) -0.03184*** -0.0259** -0.03704*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0101) (0.0111) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.09667*** -0.07111*** -0.13355*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0200) (0.0207) 
Other Christian(4) -0.03158 -0.04403 -0.02422 
 (0.0245) (0.0336) (0.0356) 
Jewish(4) -0.05405*** -0.06778** -0.03836 
 (0.0184) (0.0269) (0.0253) 
Muslim(4) -0.1219*** -0.14509*** -0.10379*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0277) (0.0305) 
Roman 
Catholic*R(5) 0.012766*** 0.012237*** 0.014869*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Protestant*R(5) 0.009373*** 0.009895*** 0.009076*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
East 
Orthodox*R(5) 0.01415*** 0.013258*** 0.018246*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
Other 
Christian*R(5) 0.009233*** 0.013023*** 0.007054 
 (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Jewish*R(5) 0.010376*** 0.008146** 0.011829*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0033) 
Muslim*R(5) 0.018992*** 0.022154*** 0.016832*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0039) 
Religiosity (R) 0.006026*** 0.003957*** 0.00717*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and religiosity. 
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Table 7 Pray and happiness (happiness>=9): Logit 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) -0.00162 0.006688 0.000188 
 (0.0069) (0.0115) (0.0088) 
Protestant(4) 0.013923* 0.019345 0.009746 
 (0.0077) (0.0131) (0.0097) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.01861* -0.00257 -0.01186 
 (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0145) 
Other Christian(4) 0.044023*** 0.057017** 0.040316** 
 (0.0147) (0.0232) (0.0193) 
Jewish(4) 0.044634** -0.00261 0.087743*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0294) (0.0276) 
Muslim(4) -0.01324 -0.03358* 0.007238 
 (0.0142) (0.0204) (0.0199) 
Roman Catholic*P(5) 0.000184 -0.00098 -0.00077 
 (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
Protestant*P(5) 0.000998 -0.0002 0.002226 
 (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
East Orthodox*P(5) 0.000314 -0.0007 -0.00302 
 (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0031) 
Other Christian*P(5) -0.00458 -0.00765 -0.00338 
 (0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0055) 
Jewish*P(5) -0.00912*** -0.00684 -0.01196*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0044) 
Muslim*P(5) 0.005194* 0.005898 0.003892 
 (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Pray (P) -0.00932*** -0.01007*** -0.0081*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and pray. 
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Table 8 Religion and happiness: OLS 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Male -0.09737***   
 (0.0091)   
Age -0.05339*** -0.05864*** -0.04894*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0022) 
Age sqrd 0.000446*** 0.000498*** 0.000399*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education years 0.017075*** 0.010916*** 0.021516*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Household size 0.04108*** 0.045259*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Children -0.05452*** -0.055*** -0.07438*** 
(dummy) (0.0123) (0.0185) (0.0167) 
Married/cohabitating 0.640213*** 0.707551*** 0.57685*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0168) (0.0147) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.03918** -0.03331 -0.04621** 
 (0.0162) (0.0232) (0.0225) 
Town(1) 0.009486 0.008965 0.006837 
 (0.0127) (0.0184) (0.0175) 
Village(1) 0.04185*** 0.060306*** 0.025839 
 (0.0129) (0.0186) (0.0179) 
Farm/countryside(1) 0.087116*** 0.114661*** 0.067739** 
 (0.0216) (0.0301) (0.0309) 
Income: coping(2) -0.41003*** -0.42818*** -0.39949*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0154) (0.0158) 
Income: difficult(2) -1.08673*** -1.09958*** -1.08258*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0211) (0.0203) 
Income: v. 
difficult(2) -1.90225*** -1.95247*** -1.86665*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0312) (0.0274) 
Paid work(3) -0.01277 0.072081*** -0.07044*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0267) (0.0188) 
Student(3) 0.206793*** 0.2956*** 0.130446*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0311) (0.0277) 
Unemployed(3) -0.3855*** -0.40361*** -0.32496*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0388) (0.0360) 
Inactive(3) -0.26765*** -0.25923*** -0.24412*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0506) (0.0442) 
Sick/disabled(3) -0.6444*** -0.57072*** -0.69369*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0402) (0.0370) 
Retired(3) -0.01074 0.066705** -0.07321*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0320) (0.0247) 
Homeworker(3) 0.067345*** 0.063441*** 0.080499*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0216) (0.0155) 
Roman Catholic(4) 0.154361*** 0.186585*** 0.125407*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Protestant(4) 0.196893*** 0.199721*** 0.183911*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0215) (0.0209) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.02889 0.041864 -0.07483** 
 (0.0243) (0.0364) (0.0330) 
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Other Christian(4) 0.209994*** 0.30245*** 0.131866** 
 (0.0382) (0.0559) (0.0522) 
Jewish(4) 0.242206*** 0.140634* 0.33156*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0807) (0.0801) 
Muslim(4) 0.192673*** 0.149316*** 0.224559*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0499) (0.0548) 
Foreign born -0.06032*** -0.00577 -0.10422*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0242) (0.0228) 
Ethnic minority -0.13079*** -0.15456*** -0.10898*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0303) (0.0304) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. 
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Table 9 Religiosity and happiness: OLS 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) -0.21501*** -0.18704*** -0.28755*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0352) (0.0377) 
Protestant(4) -0.0716** -0.00772 -0.13843*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0431) (0.0484) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.27561*** -0.25622*** -0.34989*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0669) (0.0667) 
Other Christian(4) -0.16815 0.048954 -0.41161*** 
 (0.1033) (0.1418) (0.1501) 
Jewish(4) 0.043265 -0.03783 0.118932 
 (0.0765) (0.1108) (0.1060) 
Muslim(4) -0.59684*** -0.60036*** -0.62162*** 
 (0.0749) (0.0975) (0.1161) 
Roman 
Catholic*R(5) 0.042568*** 0.04901*** 0.047054*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0060) 
Protestant*R(5) 0.032607*** 0.026068*** 0.039348*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0078) 
East Orthodox*R(5) 0.028955*** 0.043319*** 0.031815*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0107) (0.0097) 
Other 
Christian*R(5) 0.031674** 0.017973 0.052886*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0201) (0.0198) 
Jewish*R(5) 0.017196 0.014955 0.020883 
 (0.0107) (0.0163) (0.0142) 
Muslim*R(5) 0.098959*** 0.099764*** 0.103138*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0135) (0.0151) 
Religiosity (R) 0.041908*** 0.034527*** 0.044182*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and religiosity. 
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Table 10 Pray and happiness: OLS 
 
Variables All Males Females 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
    
Roman Catholic(4) 0.079652*** 0.174735*** 0.065605* 
 (0.0286) (0.0476) (0.0366) 
Protestant(4) 0.171759*** 0.167907*** 0.174426*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0566) (0.0422) 
East Orthodox(4) -0.14298*** 0.022656 -0.17395*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0706) (0.0532) 
Other Christian(4) 0.169837*** 0.280309*** 0.140852* 
 (0.0637) (0.1012) (0.0831) 
Jewish(4) 0.413994*** 0.221888* 0.59521*** 
 (0.0890) (0.1286) (0.1238) 
Muslim(4) 0.16887*** 0.16235** 0.186334** 
 (0.0572) (0.0812) (0.0818) 
Roman 
Catholic*P(5) 0.001847 -0.01185 -0.00055 
 (0.0052) (0.0080) (0.0071) 
Protestant*P(5) -0.00598 -0.00298 -0.00919 
 (0.0062) (0.0097) (0.0083) 
East Orthodox*P(5) 0.017353** -0.00275 0.013717 
 (0.0080) (0.0125) (0.0109) 
Other Christian*P(5) -0.01916 -0.02078 -0.03685 
 (0.0163) (0.0231) (0.0238) 
Jewish*P(5) -0.04772*** -0.03075 -0.06439*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0216) (0.0197) 
Muslim*P(5) -0.01687 -0.02975* -0.00584 
 (0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0177) 
Pray (P) -0.03154*** -0.03103*** -0.02697*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0050) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p˂0.01; **p˂0.05; *p˂0.10. 
Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current 
income; (3) last 7 days any other activity; and (4) no religious affiliation or 
other non-Christian affiliation. (5) Interactions terms involving religious 
denomination and pray. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Female Vote and the Rise of AKP in Turkey‡ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‡This chapter refers to the article co-written with Jan Fidrmuc. The article was presented at the 
European Public Choice Society Conference in 2014 and was published as a CESifo Working 
Paper (Working Paper No: 5226). 
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Abstract 
 
We investigate how gender-related differences in voting behaviour shaped the rise of 
the AKP, the moderately Islamic party that has ruled Turkey since 2002. We find that 
education level and religiosity are the main determinants of voting behaviour of both 
men and women in Turkey. The effect of education on the support for the AKP, 
however, is dramatically different for men and women in 2002: it is negative for 
women but hump-shaped for men. We argue that this difference may be driven by 
expected distributional implications of adopting more conservative religious norms for 
low-skilled men and women.  
 
Keywords: Gender gap, voting, Turkey, Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
democracy, Islam. 
JEL Codes: O15, P48, Z12 
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1. Introduction 
 
Gender differences in political attitudes and voting behaviour have gained 
importance with the enfranchisement of women at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This has led to the preponderance of studies on the political “gender gap” 
along three dimensions: gender differences in mass political participation (falling in 
recent years), differences between men’s and women’s votes (electoral gap), and 
different party identification of men and women (partisan gap).1 For the purpose of 
our study, we use the term gender gap to denote the different voting behaviour of men 
and women. Although the gender gap in voting behaviour has significant effects on 
the results of elections both in developed and developing countries, almost all of 
studies investigate this phenomenon for developed countries. In contrast, we examine 
the gender gap in voting behaviour of Turkish men and women. Hence, our study fills 
two important gaps in the literature by considering a country that is both developing 
and Muslim at the same time.  
The most dramatic political development in Turkey’s recent history has been the 
rise of the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP, its Turkish acronym), 
which was founded in 2001 as a moderately Islamic party. Departing from the 
previously mainly secular orientation of Turkish mainstream political parties, the AKP 
advocates a greater role for religious (Islamic) values in the public and private life. 
The AKP scored a landslide victory in the 2002 election, when it won 34 percent of 
votes and captured almost two thirds of seats in the parliament (Turkish electoral rules 
require parties to receive at least 10% of all votes to be represented in the parliament; 
those that fail to attain this threshold see their votes redistributed to the more successful 
parties). This was followed by further electoral success in 2007, when the AKP saw 
its support reach 47 percent, and again in 2011 and 2015 (50 percent on both 
occasions). In 2014, the AKP leader and incumbent Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, won in the first round of the presidential election with 52% of the vote and 
became the first directly-elected President of Turkey.  
Turkey under AKP has gradually abandoned the strict secularism that was in 
place since Atatürk’s founding of the modern Turkish state. On the one hand, this has 
arguably increased religious freedom, for example, by allowing religious symbols such 
                                                          
1 See Hill (2003: 69), Conover (1988: 985), and the references therein.  
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as headscarves in public buildings, schools and workplaces. On the other hand, the 
greater acceptance of Islamic norms in everyday life can potentially have an 
asymmetrically adverse effect on women’s lives. A conservative interpretation of 
Islamic norms ascribes different roles to men and women in most aspects of everyday 
life, and it gives more power to men than to women. As a result, women’s participation 
in politics, the labor market, social life and/or their equality with men in the legal 
system are often circumscribed in Muslim countries2. Since 2002, the government’s 
actions and pronouncements increasingly reveal such conservative attitudes towards 
women. 
Whether the ascent of AKP in 2002 indeed affected the position of women in the 
society and the labor market is not clear. Female labor force participation rate fell from 
29 percent in 2002 (and 31 percent in 1999, see Table 1) to 25 percent by 2005. The 
decline in female participation, however, was relatively short-lived: it recovered after 
2005, rising to 32 percent in 2013. Male participation rate also fluctuated during the 
same period although the swings were more modest (especially when considering the 
much higher initial level) and the decline even more short-lived: from 78 percent in 
1999 to 73 percent in 2003, rising subsequently to 76 percent by 2013. It is therefore 
not clear whether the fall in female participation after the rise of AKP can be attributed 
to its policy decisions rather than to some other causes, such as the economic crisis 
that hit Turkey just before the AKP’s rise, in 2001.  
In fact, it is even possible that the rise of the AKP could improve the labor-
market position of women. Myersson (2014) considers an earlier episode in 1994 when 
a different Islamic party (Refah) won in a number of local elections in Turkey. His 
results suggest that the municipalities controlled by this party subsequently 
experienced increased secondary-school and high-school enrollment and completion 
rates. His interpretation of this effect is that pious female students may have been 
discouraged by the strict secular policies (in particular, the headscarf ban) followed in 
schools elsewhere. In the longer term, increased human-capital acquisition translated 
into adolescent marriage rates, higher political participation, and even lower 
subsequent support for Islamic parties among female voters. In a similar vein, 
                                                          
2 For example, some Muslim societies impose restrictions (either formal or informal) on women’s dress, 
labor-market participation, education, property and inheritance rights, ability to testify in a court of law 
on equal terms with men, freedom to marry non-Muslims (allowed for men but not for women), 
entitlements to seek divorce and/or custody over children, or even issues as basic as being allowed to 
leave one’s house unaccompanied or to drive. 
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Çörekçioğlu (2015) considers the effect of AKP on female employment at the level of 
municipalities. She finds that towns with AKP mayors do not have significantly 
different gender composition of municipal employment compared to towns with 
mayors from other parties.  
Given the different roles ascribed to men and women in traditional Muslim 
societies, it is reasonable to expect differences in the support for the AKP among male 
and female voters. Similarly, greater application of traditional Islamic norms may have 
different effects on urban vs rural voters, young vs old, highly skilled/educated vs low-
skilled, and so on. This is because the impact of behavioural restrictions imposed by 
traditional norms should depend on the composition of consumption: household with 
relatively modern (Westernized) pattern of consumption should be affected more than 
household following traditional lifestyles. We therefore consider the determinants of 
support for the AKP, and for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main 
opposition party, in the 2002 election, when the AKP rose to power, as well as the 
subsequent election in 2007, which confirmed its primacy in Turkish politics. Using 
the European Social Survey, we relate the support for these two parties to a broad array 
of socio-economic characteristics of respondents, including their gender, education, 
and religiosity. The results of our analysis suggest that education and religiosity are 
the main drivers of voting behaviour: votes for the AKP increase with religiosity and 
fall with education, both among male and female voters. When we allow for a non-
linear effect of education, however, we observe a remarkable difference between men 
and women in the 2002 election: while formal education always translates into lower 
support for AKP among women, the pattern is hump-shaped for men. The peak support 
for AKP among men is attained at approximately five years of education, which, in 
Turkey, corresponds to completed primary school education. The pattern of support 
for the CHP is roughly the reverse of that for the AKP.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
outline the existing literature on the gender gap in voting behaviour. In section 3, we 
express our data sources and methodology. In section 4, we discuss our empirical 
results in detail and, in section 5, we conclude.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The political attitudes of women have become a hotly debated issue as women 
started to receive the right to vote at the beginning of the twentieth century (the first 
country to introduce women’s suffrage being New Zealand in 1893). In this period, it 
was speculated that women’s vote would be distinctive and induce dramatic changes 
to party fortunes (Hill, 2003: 70). During the 1950s and 1960s, the difference between 
the men’s and women’s votes was modest but nonetheless women were more inclined 
to support conservative parties both in Western Europe and the United States. This 
phenomenon came to be referred to as the “traditional gender gap” (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2000: 443).  
At the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s, the traditional gender gap 
seemed to disappear and women begun to move to the left of men in the United States 
and in many European countries (Emmenegger and Manow, 2014; Iversen and 
Rosenbluth, 2006: 12). This new cleavage between men’s and women’s political 
attitudes was denoted as the “modern gender gap” (Inglehart and Norris, 2000: 444). 
Since the political differences between men and women are not identical across 
countries, recent studies of the gender gap have often reached contradictory results 
about the nature and the extent of the phenomenon.  
Previous studies have put forward several explanations of the differing political 
attitudes of men and women. One of the earliest explanations for the gender gap, 
namely socialization, emphasizes the childhood experiences of men and women 
(Studlar, McAllister and Hayes 1998: 782). According to this approach, political 
differences between men and women result from the sex-role conditioning and 
contrasting moral values conveyed to boys and girls by their parents (Manza and 
Brooks, 1998: 1240). As a consequence of this traditional socialization, based on the 
belief that the main responsibility of women is child rearing, women become 
conditioned to be more concerned about the protection of life and cooperative decision 
making than men (Alexandre, 2004: 548). 
The second approach to gender differences in political attitudes is based on the 
women’s autonomy thesis and asserts that women who are more autonomous from 
men have a tendency to deviate more from men also in their political behaviours 
(Howell and Day, 2000: 860). In Becker’s influential study on family (1985), it is 
assumed that the interests of family members are fully harmonized and therefore their 
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political attitudes are expected to be the same. However, because of the differences 
between the interests of divorced and single women’s and the others, some researchers 
argue that Becker’s model becomes inaccurate when the rising divorce rates are taken 
into account (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Aidt and Dallal, 2008). Indeed, with the 
rising divorce rates since 1960s, a number of analysts have found evidence in favor of 
women’s autonomy thesis (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006).  
The third approach to explaining the gender gap in political attitudes focuses on 
women’s labor-force participation. This approach observes that although rising 
participation of women in the labor force has strengthened the position of women, it 
has not resulted in full equality in the labor market, political life or family. This 
explains why women are more concerned about unequal treatment and tend to be more 
leftist than men (Togeby, 1994: 217). According to this approach, there are three 
different ways in which increasing labor force participation of women results in a 
gender gap in political behaviour (Manza and Brooks, 1998: 1243): First, the 
integration of women in the labor force exposes them to policy debates and other 
information about political campaigns. Hence, political awareness of women rises with 
their participation in the labor force. Second, since paid employment exposes women 
to gender inequalities, women tend to support political activism and feminist political 
goals. Finally, women are more dependent on the public sector for employment than 
men and they rely much more on social programs for supporting their families. Since 
leftist parties are generally more biased towards redistributive policies than the rightist 
parties, working women are apt to vote for the leftist parties. 
Increasing labor force participation plays a crucial role in the Developmental 
Theory of the Gender Gap which has been proposed by Inglehart and Norris (2000). 
This theory states that in traditional societies, women are dissuaded from participating 
in the labor force since child bearing and child rearing are regarded as their main 
objectives. However, in post-industrial societies, increasing labor force participation 
of women and other cultural changes have had dramatic impact on women’s voting 
behaviour.   
The fourth explanation of political differences between men’s and women’s 
attitudes suggests that the main reason behind the gender gap is the feminist identity 
and consciousness (Conover, 1988: 988). Conover (1988) states that in the absence of 
feminism, women’s values are dominated by male-oriented values. However, by 
92 
 
becoming a feminist, women realize their basic values and form their own attitudes on 
political issues. According to this approach, feminists generally advocate egalitarian 
attitudes and thus support left-wing parties far more than non-feminists (Bergh, 2007: 
238).  
The final approach propounds two alternative hypotheses about this 
phenomenon (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999: 864-866): The Attitude Hypothesis and 
the Salience Hypothesis. While the Attitude Hypothesis argues that the gender gap 
stems from the distinct preferences of men and women on different political issues, 
the Salience Hypothesis asserts that the main reason of the gender gap is the differing 
weights men and women apply to political issues. For example, while most women 
may prefer increased social welfare spending and consider abortion as one of the most 
important issues determining their voting behaviour, most men may prefer decreased 
social welfare spending and give relatively little weight to abortion in their voting 
decisions (Chaney, 1998: 312). Similarly, economic issues can have differential 
impacts on men’s and women’s political choices. As stated by Welch and Hibbing 
(1994), in contrast to men who behave egocentrically and consider their own economic 
circumstances in their voting decisions, women have a tendency to behave 
sociotropically and to take into account the country’s economic conditions instead of 
their family’s while determining their political choices. Although the Attitude and the 
Salience Hypotheses shed some light on the different political attitudes of men and 
women about policy issues that directly relate to a person’s gender, they are incapable 
of explaining different political choices about issues in which gender does not play a 
role. Thus, other socioeconomic and cultural variables should be taken into account 
when dealing with issues that are not directly related to a person’s gender (Bergh, 
2007: 239). 
Given that few Muslim countries are democracies with free and fair elections, it 
is not surprising that there is limited literature on the determinants of electoral 
outcomes in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the sea change to Turkish politics 
brought about by the AKP victory in 2002 has resulted in some (limited) interest in the 
background of AKP’s rise. Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) emphasize the role played by 
the main cleavages in Turkish politics and argue that the Islamism vs secularism and 
Turkish vs Kurdish nationalism dimensions matter more than the standard left-right 
dimension dominant in Western politics. Çarkoğlu (2012), in turn, argues that the rise 
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of AKP has been attributable to ideological rather than to economic concerns of voters. 
Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar (2005) consider voting intentions and find that 
AKP supporters include mainly young voters, in particular males, and those who are 
not in favor of Turkey’s entry into the European Union.  
As the preceding discussion illustrates, much of the literature on the differences 
in political preferences of male and female voters focuses on advanced democratic 
countries, with studies on Muslim countries being particularly rare.3 In this paper, we 
seek to help fill this gap.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on individual survey data from the European 
Social Survey (ESS henceforth). The ESS surveys are carried out every two years in 
around 30 countries in Europe and its neighborhood (not all countries feature in every 
wave). They follow a unified methodology and use the same basic questionnaire (while 
allowing for country-specific questions). The surveys address a wide range issues such 
as media exposure, political interest and participation, economic, political and social 
attitudes, and collect also detailed information on socio-economic characteristics of 
the respondents and their households. Importantly, the ESSs include retrospective 
questions on the respondents’ voting behaviour in the most recent election. For our 
analysis, we are interested in the electoral preferences of Turkish voters at the time of 
AKP’s rise to power in 2002. Therefore, we use ESS Waves 2 (collected in 2004) 
(European Social Survey, 2004) and 4 (2008) (European Social Survey, 2008), which 
contain information on past voting behaviour in the 2002 and 2007 elections, 
respectively.  
The ESS typically features 1-2 thousand respondents per country per wave; we 
have 1156 observations with information on voting behaviour in the 2nd wave 
(European Social Survey, 2004) and 1304 in the 4th wave (European Social Survey, 
2008). The dependent variable equals to 1 if the respondent voted for the party in 
question in the last election and zero otherwise. We consider the two main parties, the 
AKP and the CHP: these were the only two parties to be represented in the parliament 
following the 2002 election (they were joined by the Nationalist Movement Party, 
                                                          
3 Appendix C summarizes the main contributions to the literature.  
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MHP, as well as by a number of independent MPs, in 2007). These two political parties 
together received approximately 54% and 68% of total votes in the 2002 and 2007 
elections, respectively (see Appendix B)4. They represent two contrasting political 
views: the AKP is a right-wing and religious party while the CHP represents the left-
wing side of the spectrum and espouses largely secular values.  
We include a number of explanatory variables which capture socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents: age, gender, number of years of education, marital 
status, household composition, urban vs rural residence, economic situation of the 
household, labor-market status of the respondent during the preceding week, 
belonging to an ethnic minority (which, in Turkey, mainly captures the Kurds5), and 
religiosity. Detailed explanations of these variables are in Appendix A. The 
regressions are estimated using the logit model. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
We estimate regressions relating voting for AKP and CHP to the respondents’ 
socio-economic characteristics including gender, age, years of education, labor-market 
participation, place of residence, living with husband/wife/partner, having children in 
the household, belonging to an ethnic minority and subjective perception about the 
household’s income. To control for the effect of religiosity on voting behaviour, we 
add a set of dummy variables that capture how often the respondent prays (results with 
self-reported degree of religiosity are very similar). All of the regressions are estimated 
for both genders together as well as for male and female respondents separately.  
Table 2 shows the determinants of support for the AKP, with socio-economic 
variables only (i.e. without religiosity). The first three models show the results of 
regressions estimated with the ESS 2 data set, while the last three models show the 
results based on ESS 4, corresponding to the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively. 
Gender does not have an effect on the support for AKP in either the 2002 or 2007 
election (see columns 1 and 4). Few of the remaining variables (age, living with 
husband/wife/partner, place of residence and belonging to an ethnic minority) are 
                                                          
4 The regression results for other parties are available upon request. 
5 No further information is available in the ESS on the ethnic identity of those respondents who 
declare to belong to an ethnic minority.  
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statistically significant. However, an important difference appears with respect to 
education when we consider male and female votes in 2002 separately. The effect of 
education is hump-shaped for males: more years of formal education initially translate 
into greater support for AKP, before the effect levels off and becomes negative. The 
maximum effect is attained at just over 5 years of education, which, in Turkey, is 
equivalent to completed primary education. The effect for women, in contrast, is 
effectively negative throughout: it is u-shaped but the minimum is attained at 19 years 
(post-graduate level), which very few women possess.  
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of education, by year, for men and women. 
Women are more represented at the bottom of the distribution: staggering 19 percent 
report to have no education at all, compared to 7 percent of men. Most respondents, 
39 percent of men and women alike, completed only primary education. Middle 
school, which requires further 3 years, was not compulsory until 19976, so that many 
ESS respondents finished their education when only 5 years of schooling was 
mandatory. The next smaller peak, at 11 years, corresponds to completed high school, 
a level that is attained by 15% of males and 12% of females in our data. Only relatively 
few attain more than high-school education, with university (at 15 years) completed 
by 4% of men and 3% of women. This, effectively, means that nearly 50% of men and 
some 65% of women in Turkey have between 0 and 5 years of education. In other 
words, the divergent effect of education on voting behaviour of male and female voters 
affects a large share of Turkish voters.  
The different relationship between education and support for AKP among low-
skilled men and women may stem from the fact that men with low level of education 
can potentially benefit from low-skilled women being excluded from the labor market, 
as may happen if Islamic social norms become more prevalent in Turkey. Therefore, 
such men could expect to see their labor-market outcomes improving under an AKP 
government. Women, whether low skilled or high skilled, in contrast, stand to gain 
little, as far as their labor-market position is concerned, from voting for the AKP.  
Interestingly, the aforementioned effect of education can only be observed 
during the 2002 election. In 2007, education has a negative effect on all voters (and, 
in unreported regression with education featuring linearly, on males and females too); 
it does not have a different effect on the men’s and women’s votes for AKP. 
                                                          
6 In 2012, compulsory education was further extended to 12 years. 
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Seemingly, once the AKP assumed power, the voting behaviour of male and female 
voters has converged. A possible explanation could be based on the fact that the rise 
of AKP did not translate into a permanent fall in employment of women, as the 
aforementioned statistics presented in Table 1 document.  
Table 3 shows the results for the AKP support, when we explain voting 
behaviour with both socio-economic variables and religiosity. Specifically, we use a 
question on how often respondents pray; the answers to this question are summarized 
in Figure 2. Clearly, Turkey is a very religious society, with 65 percent of men and 77 
percent of women claiming to pray every day. Nevertheless, we observe some change 
over time, with the share of those who pray every day falling slightly between 2004 
and 2008 while the shares of those praying only on religious holy days rises (these 
figures are available upon request).  
The regression results with religiosity are very similar to the previous results. As 
it is expected, people’s attitude about religion is one of the most significant 
determinants of voting for the AKP: respondents who pray rarely or never do not vote 
for AKP. As in the previous regressions, the gender dummy does not have an effect on 
the votes for AKP. Hence, taking into account religiosity does not change the results 
in respect to the gender gap in voting behaviour. The differentiated effect of the 
quadratic polynomial of education, nevertheless, occurs also when controlling for 
religiosity. The pattern for men is again hump-shaped while that for women is u-
shaped, with the respective turning points attained at almost identical education levels 
as in the preceding analysis without religiosity. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the CHP. Again, we first consider only socio-
economic variables and then add religiosity. As in Tables 2 and 3, the first three models 
show the results of regressions estimated by using ESS 2, while the last three models 
show the results of regressions estimated using ESS 4.  
Similar to the analysis for AKP, education plays an important role in determining 
support for the CHP. For men and women together, the effect of education is positive. 
When considering the two genders separately, the pattern for males is u-shaped while 
that for females is hump-shaped, the reverse of the results for the AKP. The lowest 
support among males is attained at just under 6 years of education. For females, the 
maximum is at over 11 years of formal education (equivalent to a high-school 
diploma). The pattern is very similar again when we add religiosity.  
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As with the AKP support, the differentiated effect of education disappears in the 
2007 election. Nevertheless, gender does appear as a statistically significant 
determinant of voting for the CHP in the 2007 election: males are significantly less 
likely to vote for this party than females. This indicates that a gender gap in voting for 
CHP appeared in that year, in contrast to 2002. Since the CHP is a center-left party 
and tends to support redistributive policies, this result is compatible with the view that 
women generally advocate egalitarian attitudes and vote for leftist parties. Finally, 
respondents who rarely or never pray are significantly more likely to vote for the CHP. 
Thus, with the AKP, religiosity is an important determinant of voting for the CHP.   
In summary; education and religiosity are the most important determinants of 
voting for both AKP and CHP. Moreover, the effect of education on voting behaviour 
is different for males and females in an important way in the 2002 election. In contrast, 
religiosity affects the voting behaviour of men and women in the same way. 
Furthermore, there is a gender gap between men and women in terms of voting for the 
CHP in 2007, with women more likely to vote for this party than men. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The differences between the voting behaviour of men and women have become 
one of the most controversial issues in political-behaviour research in recent years. 
Although there are quite a number of studies on the gender gap in voting behaviour in 
developed countries, almost none of the analyses investigate this phenomenon in the 
context of developing or Muslim countries.  
In this study, we examine the voting behaviour of Turkish voters in the 2002 and 
2007 elections, which heralded and cemented, respectively, the rise to power of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). We are particularly interested in the differences 
between the voting behaviour of male and female voters, given that Islamic cultural 
and social norms impose important restrictions on the behaviour of both genders, with 
the restrictions on women’s behaviour rather more onerous. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of gender differences in voting 
behaviour in Turkey, and one of only few for Muslim countries in general. 
According to our results, education and religiosity are both important 
determinants of men’s and women’s votes. While religiosity affects the votes of men 
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and women in the same way, the effect of education differs with respect to gender. In 
particular, we find that the support for the AKP among female voters falls with 
increasing education while the pattern for males is non-monotonic, rising first, peaking 
around the equivalent of primary education (5 years of schooling) and only then 
falling. The support for the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), is the opposite, hump-shaped for women and u-shaped for men, with almost 
the same turning point for men as in the case of the AKP support. It is striking that this 
pattern only prevails in the 2002 election; in the subsequent 2007 election, education 
shows a negative (positive) effect on the votes for the AKP (CHP) for both men and 
women alike. Instead, a standard gender gap appears in the 2007 election, with female 
voters more likely to vote for the CHP than males.  
We believe our results reflect two kinds of distributional effects of greater 
application of traditional Islamic norms in the society: it strengthens the position of 
men at the expense of women, and it imposes more restrictions on the quality of life 
and consumption options of highly educated individuals (who tend to be more 
Westernized) than on those of less educated. The different effect of education on male 
and female voting behaviour in 2002 may be driven by the first of these two effects. 
In particular, low-skilled men may have expected to benefit from restrictions being 
placed on labor-market participation by women (who are on average less skilled than 
men in Turkey). Hence, the rise of political Islam in Turkey may have been assisted 
by gender conflict in the labor market. Female labor force participation indeed fell 
from 2002 to 2005 (see Table 1). However, this trend proved only temporary and 
female participation started rising again from 2006 onwards. The fact that the AKP did 
not significantly restrict women’s participation in the labor market may explain why 
the hump-shaped effect of education on men’s voting behaviour only appears in 2002 
and not in 2007. In the latter election, instead, the second effect of Islamization seems 
to dominate.  
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Figure 1 Years of education by gender 
 
Notes: Primary education comprises 5 years and is compulsory. Middle school is 
completed at 8 years (and has been compulsory since 1997). 11 years corresponds to 
completed high school and 15 years is an undergraduate degree.  
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) (2004, 2008). ESS Wave-2, ESS Wave-4-
Turkey, www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
      
Figure 2 Religiosity  
 
Notes: Responses to the question “How often pray apart from at religious services.” 
The possible answers were every day (1), more than once a week (2), once a week (3), 
at least once a month (4), only on special holy days (5), less often (6), and never (7).  
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) (2004, 2008). ESS Wave-2, Wave-4-Turkey, 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
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Table 1 Basic statistics, Turkey 
 
 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 2011  2012 2013 
Unemployment  7.7 6.5 8.4 10.4 10.5 10.8 10.6 10.2 10.3 11 14 11.9 9.8 9.2 10 
LF Participation Rate 
[15-64] 54.3 51.5 51.3 51.2 49.9 49.2 49.4 49.3 49.4 50.2 51.3 52.4 53.4 53.5 53.5 
LF Participation Rate 
[15-64 Males] 78.4 76.1 75.3 74.2 72.9 74.3 74.7 74.2 74.2 74.7 75.3 75.5 76.3 75.6 75.6 
LF Participation Rate 
[15-64 Females] 31.3 27.9 28.4 29.3 28 25.2 25.2 25.6 25.6 26.7 28.4 30.2 31.5 32.2 32.2 
GDP growth  -3.4 6.8 -5.7 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.2 
GDP pc growth -4.8 5.2 -7.1 4.6 3.8 7.9 7.0 5.6 3.4 -0.5 -6.1 7.6 7.5 0.9 2.9 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015). http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators.  
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Table 2 Determinants of voting for AKP 
 
 ESS Wave 2 (2004) ESS Wave 4 (2008) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) 
Male 0.0587   0.0661   
  (0.0535)    (0.0533)   
Age 
-
0.0143*** -0.0143 -0.0120 -0.0022 -0.0053 0.0093 
  (0.0071)  (0.0116)  (0.0099)  (0.0065)  (0.0110)  (0.0088) 
Age sqrd 0.0001* 0.0002 0.0001 0.00002 0.00009 -0.00010 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Education years -0.0086 0.0492** -0.0344** -0.0275** -0.0183 -0.0255 
  (0.0127)  (0.0236)  (0.0161)  (0.0133)  (0.0225)  (0.0174) 
Education years  -0.0010 
-
0.0046*** 0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0008 
     sqrd  (0.0008)  (0.0014)  (0.0010)  (0.0008)  (0.0013)  (0.0012) 
Household size -0.0034 0.0043 -0.0088 0.0061 -0.0162 0.0291* 
   (0.0097)  (0.0148)  (0.0133)  (0.0104)  (0.0157)  (0.0163) 
Children  0.0576 -0.0037 0.1059* 0.0226 0.0342 0.0136 
   (dummy)  (0.0434)  (0.0691)  (0.0581)  (0.0396)  (0.0627)  (0.0530) 
Married/cohabitating 0.1138** 0.1583** 0.1145* 0.0148 -0.0545 0.0376 
  (0.0458)  (0.0784)  (0.0627)  (0.0451)  (0.0822)  (0.0557) 
Suburb of city(1) 
-
0.1852*** -0.2632** -0.1176 -0.0702 0.0014 -0.1309 
  (0.0654)  (0.1145)  (0.0827)  (0.0666)  (0.1040)  (0.0868) 
Town(1) -0.0627 -0.0639 -0.0625 -0.0388 -0.0558 -0.0362 
  (0.0422)  (0.0637)  (0.0587)  (0.0499)  (0.0791)  (0.0657) 
Village(1) 0.0365 -0.0530 0.1247** -0.0522 -0.1119* 0.0069 
  (0.0424)  (0.0612)  (0.0621)  (0.0396)  (0.0579)  (0.0574) 
Farm/countryside(1) -0.2883 -0.3427 
0 
(omitted) 0 (omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
  (0.3032)  (0.3085)     
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Income: coping(2) 0.0405 0.0034 0.0741 -0.0536 
-
0.1881** 0.0544 
  (0.0590)  (0.0948)  (0.0805)  (0.0643)  (0.0958)  (0.0884) 
Income: difficult(2) 0.0077 -0.0924 0.0914 -0.0399 -0.1509 0.0445 
  (0.0641)  (0.1034)  (0.0868)  (0.0671)  (0.1015)  (0.0913) 
Income: v.difficult (2) -0.0114 -0.1069 0.0293 -0.0945 
-
0.2385** 0.0249 
  (0.0700)  (0.1140)  (0.0941)  (0.0729)  (0.1098)  (0.1002) 
Paid work(3) 0.0174 0.0350 -0.0247 0.0243 -0.0026 0.0934 
  (0.0677)  (0.0844)  (0.1277)  (0.0951)  (0.1200)  (0.1662) 
Student(3) -0.0174 -0.1499 0.1597 0.0315 0.0125 0.0462 
  (0.1319)  (0.1818)  (0.2194)  (0.1293)  (0.1731)  (0.2074) 
Unemployed(3) -0.0035 0.0268 0.0373 0.0650 0.0758 0.1947 
  (0.0922)  (0.1110)  (0.2264)  (0.1044)  (0.1304)  (0.2000) 
Inactive(3) 0.0175 0.2028 -0.1620 0.0187 -0.0018 0.0191 
  (0.0989)  (0.1419)  (0.1575)  (0.1144)  (0.1419)  (0.2167) 
Sick/disabled(3) 0.2783 0.3099 
0 
(omitted) -0.2144 -0.0571 
0 
(omitted) 
  (0.2188)  (0.2392)   (0.2689)  (0.3528)  
Retired(3) 0.1244 0.0704 0.1462 -0.0671 -0.1439 -0.0924 
  (0.0765)  (0.0993)  (0.1503)  (0.0998)  (0.1272)  (0.1838) 
Homeworker(3) 0.1139 0.4798** 0.0473 0.1110 -0.1400 0.1154 
  (0.0717)  (0.2111)  (0.1034)  (0.0999)  (0.3845)  (0.1550) 
Ethnic minority -
0.1780*** -0.1157 
-
0.2463*** -0.1906*** 
-
0.1910** -0.1908** 
  (0.0599)  (0.0909)  (0.0845)  (0.0613)  (0.0878)  (0.0895) 
 
Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p ˂  0.01:     **p 
˂ 0.05 *p˂ 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with 
current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity. 
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Table 3 Determinants of voting for AKP (with religiosity) 
 
 ESS Wave 2 (2004) ESS Wave 4 (2008) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) 
Male 0.0764   0.0641   
  (0.0548)    (0.0546)   
Age -0.0155** -0.0138 -0.0140 -0.0006 0.0041 0.0070 
  (0.0073)  (0.0119)  (0.0101)  (0.0067)  (0.0113)  (0.0090) 
Age sqrd 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Education years -0.0128 0.0453* -0.0364** -0.0302** -0.0236 -0.0265 
  (0.0128)  (0.0238)  (0.0163)  (0.0137)  (0.0234)  (0.0178) 
Education years  -0.0007 -0.0043*** 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0007 
     sqrd  (0.0008)  (0.0014)  (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0012) 
Household size -0.0027 0.0032 -0.0061 0.0023 -0.0236 0.0260 
   (0.0098)  (0.0152)  (0.0135)  (0.0107)  (0.0166)  (0.0166) 
Children  0.0461 -0.0068 0.0806 0.0362 0.0292 0.0501 
   (dummy)  (0.0440)  (0.0708)  (0.0592)  (0.0407)  (0.0656)  (0.0547) 
Married/ 
cohabitating 0.1122** 0.1467* 0.1266** 0.0015 -0.1057 0.0347 
  (0.0464)  (0.0810)  (0.0637)  (0.0467)  (0.0882)  (0.0573) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.1977*** -0.2803** -0.1270 -0.0929 0.0018 -0.1646* 
  (0.0661)  (0.1153)  (0.0838)  (0.0684)  (0.1074)  (0.0907) 
Town(1) -0.0552 -0.0571 -0.0730 -0.0471 -0.0718 -0.0337 
  (0.0433)  (0.0669)  (0.0600)  (0.0510)  (0.0822)  (0.0665) 
Village(1) 0.0301 -0.0692 0.1111* -0.0487 -0.1490** 0.0349 
  (0.0430)  (0.0627)  (0.0634)  (0.0410)  (0.0611)  (0.0598) 
Farm/countrysid
e(1) -0.2937 -0.3552 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
  (0.3075)  (0.3164)     
Income: 
coping(2) 0.0625 0.0201 0.0837 -0.0568 -0.1863* 0.0436 
  (0.0592)  (0.0954)  (0.0816)  (0.0665)  (0.1006)  (0.0909) 
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Income: 
difficult(2) 0.0289 -0.0753 0.0982 -0.0445 -0.1374 0.0351 
  (0.0645)  (0.1049)  (0.0880)  (0.0693)  (0.1072)  (0.0936) 
Income: v. 
difficult (2) 0.0066 -0.0946 0.0329 -0.0939 -0.2426** 0.0303 
  (0.0703)  (0.1156)  (0.0952)  (0.0751)  (0.1148)  (0.1031) 
Paid work(3) 0.0308 0.0581 0.0022 0.0333 0.0153 0.0760 
  (0.0694)  (0.0877)  (0.1300)  (0.0977)  (0.1225)  (0.1740) 
Student(3) 0.0107 -0.0846 0.1333 0.1137 0.1274 0.0954 
  (0.1374)  (0.1913)  (0.2211)  (0.1339)  (0.1806)  (0.2166) 
Unemployed(3) 0.0253 0.0717 0.0930 0.0639 0.0792 0.1638 
  (0.0954)  (0.1159)  (0.2416)  (0.1069)  (0.1333)  (0.2065) 
Inactive(3) 0.0514 0.2601* -0.1216 0.0254 0.0302 -0.0134 
  (0.1015)  (0.1481)  (0.1610)  (0.1184)  (0.1488)  (0.2225) 
Sick/disabled(3) 0.2748 0.3117 0 (omitted) -0.2197 -0.0083 0 (omitted) 
  (0.2200)  (0.2410)   (0.2739)  (0.3649)  
Retired(3) 0.1344* 0.0860 0.1789 -0.0737 -0.1478 -0.1034 
  (0.0776)  (0.1005)  (0.1522)  (0.1025)  (0.1301)  (0.1917) 
Homeworker(3) 0.1235* 0.5446** 0.0642 0.1136 -0.1082 0.0880 
  (0.0728)  (0.2320)  (0.1052)  (0.1030)  (0.3812)  (0.1636) 
Ethnic minority -0.1869*** -0.1123 -0.2670*** -0.1905*** -0.1479 -0.2010** 
  (0.0611)  (0.0930)  (0.0859)  (0.0645)  (0.0980)  (0.0916) 
Pray more than 
once per week -0.0468 -0.1005 0.0106 -0.0786 -0.0814 -0.0877 
  (0.0546)  (0.0719)  (0.0915)  (0.0541)  (0.0713)  (0.0886) 
Pray  -0.0240 -0.0039 -0.0675 -0.1267* -0.1865** -0.1057 
   once per week  (0.0730)  (0.0922)  (0.1321)  (0.0710)  (0.0946)  (0.1137) 
Pray at least -0.1224 -0.1542 -0.1118 0.05787 0.0876 0.0741 
   once a month  (0.1221)  (0.1566)  (0.2153)  (0.1002)  (0.1564)  (0.1316) 
Pray only on  -0.0929 0.12160 -0.4505 -0.1480** -0.3948*** -0.0336 
Special holidays  (0.1366)  (0.1938)  (0.2774)  (0.0752)  (0.1398)  (0.0959) 
Pray less often -0.4251*** -0.3625** -0.4856** -0.2452** -0.5845** -0.1363 
  (0.1180)  (0.1521)  (0.1976)  (0.1211)  (0.2715)  (0.1456) 
Pray never  -0.3683*** -0.4190** -0.3363 -0.5058*** -0.6107*** -0.4303*** 
  (0.1301)  (0.1694)  (0.2253)  (0.1088)  (0.1964)  (0.1333) 
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Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p ˂ 0.01: **p 
˂ 0.05 *p˂ 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with 
current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity. 
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Table 4 Determinants of voting for CHP 
 
 ESS Wave 2 (2004) ESS Wave 4 (2008) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) 
Male -0.0475   -0.0689**   
  (0.0305)    (0.0327)   
Age 0.0104** 0.0130* 0.0053 0.0094** 0.0223*** -0.0005 
  (0.0046)  (0.0074)  (0.0058)  (0.0047)  (0.0084)  (0.0057) 
Age sqrd -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00022*** 0.00003 
  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Education years 0.0159** -0.0137 0.0285*** 0.0190** -0.0020 0.0217* 
  (0.0078)  (0.0131)  (0.0097)  (0.0094)  (0.0157)  (0.0115) 
Education years  -0.0004 0.0012* -0.0013** 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 
     sqrd  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0009)  (0.0007) 
Household size -0.0101 -0.0030 -0.0167* -0.0154* 0.0006 -0.0312** 
   (0.0072)  (0.0098)  (0.0098)  (0.0088)  (0.0118)  (0.0126) 
Children  -0.0273 0.0341 -0.0580* 0.0079 -0.0197 0.0261 
   (dummy)  (0.0271)  (0.0437)  (0.0325)  (0.0279)  (0.0426)  (0.0356) 
Married/cohabitating -0.0354 
-
0.0954** 0.0041 -0.0407 -0.0510 -0.0415 
  (0.0270)  (0.0460)  (0.0339)  (0.0288)  (0.0533)  (0.0338) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.0729 -0.0794 -0.0798 -0.0872 -0.0102 -0.1520* 
  (0.0499)  (0.0830)  (0.0559)  (0.0588)  (0.0768)  (0.0903) 
Town(1) -0.0105 0.0012 -0.0198 -0.0556 -0.0335 -0.0519 
  (0.0253)  (0.0362)  (0.0325)  (0.0374)  (0.0577)  (0.0473) 
Village(1) -0.0457 -0.0080 -0.0792** 0.0314 0.0556 0.0025 
  (0.0274)  (0.0366)  (0.0381)  (0.0274)  (0.0396)  (0.0380) 
Farm/countryside(1) 0.0922 0.0948 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
  (0.1374)  (0.1349)     
Income: coping(2) 0.0489 0.1015 0.0152 0.0040 0.0754 -0.0396 
  (0.0381)  (0.0623)  (0.0461)  (0.0395)  (0.0643)  (0.0489) 
Income: difficult(2) 0.0204 0.0466 0.0083 -0.0005 0.1012 -0.0647 
  (0.0425)  (0.0701)  (0.0505)  (0.0424)  (0.0688)  (0.0521) 
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Income: v.difficult (2) 0.0936** 0.1424** 0.0804 0.0173 0.0773 -0.0136 
  (0.0443)  (0.0715)  (0.0538)  (0.0475)  (0.0763)  (0.0588) 
Paid work(3) 0.0191 -0.0257 0.1063 0.0089 0.0153 -0.0113 
  (0.0429)  (0.0512)  (0.0709)  (0.0649)  (0.0811)  (0.1106) 
Student(3) 0.0302 0.0668 0.0075 -0.0638 -0.0569 -0.0573 
  (0.0705)  (0.0816)  (0.1315)  (0.0888)  (0.1254)  (0.1293) 
Unemployed(3) 0.0337 -0.0107 0.0755 -0.0861 -0.0991 -0.0911 
  (0.0560)  (0.0645)  (0.1070)  (0.0771)  (0.0947)  (0.1412) 
Inactive(3) 0.0225 -0.0615 0.1158 -0.0100 -0.0047 -0.0368 
  (0.0633)  (0.0945)  (0.0842)  (0.0794)  (0.0946)  (0.1645) 
Sick/disabled(3) 0.0079 0.0287 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
  (0.1278)  (0.1329)     
Retired(3) -0.0188 0.0300 -0.0446 -0.0090 0.0008 0.0197 
  (0.0472)  (0.0610)  (0.0834)  (0.0675)  (0.0852)  (0.1158) 
Homeworker(3) -0.0146 -0.0854 0.0397 -0.0528 0 (omitted) -0.0145 
  (0.0453)  (0.1224)  (0.0624)  (0.0669)   (0.1042) 
Ethnic minority -0.0375 -0.1038 0.0314 -0.0259 -0.1470* 0.0684 
  (0.0434)  (0.0692)  (0.0524)  (0.0475)  (0.0828)  (0.0583) 
 
Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p ˂ 0.01: **p 
˂ 0.05 *p˂ 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with 
current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity. 
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Table 5 Determinants of voting for CHP (with religiosity) 
 
 ESS Wave 2 (2004) ESS Wave 4 (2008) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) (Both 
genders) 
(Males) (Females) 
Male -0.0711**   -0.0746**   
  (0.0301)    (0.0323)   
Age 0.0111** 0.0117 0.0092 0.0072 0.0136* 0.0012 
  (0.0044)  (0.0074)  (0.0056)  (0.0046)  (0.0079)  (0.0055) 
Age sqrd -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.00004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Education years 0.0188** -0.0121 0.0296*** 0.0208** 0.0026 0.0195* 
  (0.0076)  (0.0133)  (0.0092)  (0.0094)  (0.0151)  (0.0115) 
Education years  -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0013** -0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 
     sqrd  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0007) 
Household size -0.0103 -0.0035 -0.0184** -0.0110 0.0060 -0.0274** 
   (0.0070)  (0.0096)  (0.0092)  (0.0086)  (0.0115)  (0.0124) 
Children  -0.0146 0.0500 -0.0343 -0.0064 -0.0087 -0.0096 
   (dummy)  (0.0265)  (0.0447)  (0.0308)  (0.0273)  (0.0412)  (0.0357) 
Married/cohabitating -0.0316 -0.0981** -0.0076 -0.0304 -0.0375 -0.0358 
  (0.0264)  (0.0487)  (0.0319)  (0.0284)  (0.0509)  (0.0334) 
Suburb of city(1) -0.0655 -0.0775 -0.0650 -0.0714 -0.0070 -0.1319 
  (0.0490)  (0.0832)  (0.0524)  (0.0563)  (0.0732)  (0.0858) 
Town(1) -0.0146 0.0029 -0.0163 -0.0448 -0.0272 -0.0421 
  (0.0249)  (0.0370)  (0.0306)  (0.0365)  (0.0549)  (0.0458) 
Village(1) -0.0352 0.0063 -0.0591* 0.0330 0.0765** -0.0148 
  (0.0267)  (0.0369)  (0.0355)  (0.0274)  (0.0388)  (0.0387) 
Farm/countryside(1) 0.0797 0.0704 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
  (0.1398)  (0.1421)     
Income: coping(2) 0.0358 0.0928 0.0050 -0.0145 0.0687 -0.0583 
  (0.0373)  (0.0627)  (0.0433)  (0.0399)  (0.0653)  (0.0486) 
Income: difficult(2) 0.0083 0.0394 -0.0094 -0.0162 0.0921 -0.0788 
  (0.0416)  (0.0708)  (0.0479)  (0.0424)  (0.0693)  (0.0515) 
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Income: v.difficult (2) 0.0782* 0.1229* 0.0761 -0.0035 0.0784 -0.0396 
  (0.0434)  (0.0721)  (0.0507)  (0.0475)  (0.0765)  (0.0585) 
Paid work(3) 0.0078 -0.0397 0.0866 0.0007 -0.0099 0.0452 
  (0.0416)  (0.0510)  (0.0680)  (0.0683)  (0.0794)  (0.1295) 
Student(3) 0.0134 0.0233 0.0390 -0.1394 -0.1591 -0.0847 
  (0.0712)  (0.0854)  (0.1234)  (0.0921)  (0.1226)  (0.1460) 
Unemployed(3) 0.0112 -0.0249 0.0337 -0.0819 -0.1118 -0.0232 
  (0.0550)  (0.0650)  (0.1016)  (0.0798)  (0.0932)  (0.1556) 
Inactive(3) -0.0040 -0.1079 0.1115 -0.0290 -0.0487 -0.0005 
  (0.0618)  (0.0957)  (0.0794)  (0.0823)  (0.0942)  (0.1755) 
Sick/disabled(3) 0.0199 0.0280 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
0 
(omitted) 
  (0.1225)  (0.1305)     
Retired(3) -0.0241 0.0192 -0.0776 0.0056 -0.0030 0.0736 
  (0.0456)  (0.0603)  (0.0799)  (0.0707)  (0.0835)  (0.1348) 
Homeworker(3) -0.0238 -0.1025 0.0374 -0.0510 
0 
(omitted) 0.0545 
  (0.0435)  (0.1202)  (0.0597)  (0.0705)   (0.1267) 
Ethnic minority 
-0.0318 -0.1057 0.0588 -0.0395 
-
0.2169*** 0.0744 
  (0.0427)  (0.0695)  (0.0483)  (0.0479)  (0.0829)  (0.0560) 
Pray more than  0.0555* 0.0475 0.0749* 0.1208*** 0.1084*** 0.1211** 
   once per week  (0.0322)  (0.0420)  (0.0440)  (0.0330)  (0.0408)  (0.0524) 
Pray  0.07415* 0.0164 0.1568*** 0.1090** 0.1165** 0.0897 
   once per week  (0.0404)  (0.0558)  (0.0554)  (0.0420)  (0.0551)  (0.0630) 
Pray at least 0.1425** 0.1264* 0.1191 0.0458 -0.0752 0.0952 
   once a month  (0.0558)  (0.0698)  (0.0889)  (0.0655)  (0.1301)  (0.0748) 
Pray only on  
0.0958 
0 
(omitted) 0.2445*** 0.1113*** 0.1949*** 0.0655 
   Special holidays  (0.0720)   (0.0926)  (0.0435)  (0.0690)  (0.0529) 
Pray less often 0.14051*** 0.0780 0.1732*** 0.1982*** 0.2947*** 0.1625** 
  (0.0470)  (0.0684)  (0.0598)  (0.0606)  (0.0996)  (0.0761) 
Pray never  0.1958*** 0.1598*** 0.2259** 0.3008*** 0.3042*** 0.2832*** 
  (0.0493)  (0.0603)  (0.0890)  (0.0485)  (0.0703)  (0.0651) 
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Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p ˂ 0.01: **p 
˂ 0.05 *p˂ 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with 
current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity. 
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Appendix A 
Descriptions of independent variables in the empirical analysis 
Name Description 
Male  The gender of respondent: 1 if male and 0 if female. 
Age  Age of respondent 
Education years  Number of the years of education  
Household size Number of household members 
Children Children present in the household (dummy) 
Married/cohabitating Respondent lives with husband/wife/partner  
Place of residence Place of residence, respondent’s description:  
1: A big city (omitted category), 2: Suburbs or outskirts of 
big city, 3: Town or small city, 4: Country village, 5: Farm 
or home in countryside 
Income  Feeling about household’s income nowadays:  
1: Living comfortably on present income (omitted category), 
2: Coping on present income, 3: Difficult on present income, 
4: Very difficult on present income 
Paid work  Doing last 7 days; paid work 
Student  Doing last 7 days; education 
Unemployed  Doing last 7 days; actively looking for a job 
Inactive  Doing last 7 days; not actively looking for a job 
Sick/disabled  Doing last 7 days; permanently sick or disabled 
Retired  Doing last 7 days; retired 
Homeworker  Doing last 7 days; housework, looking after children, others 
Ethnic Belong to ethnic minority group in country 
Pray  How often pray apart from religious services;  
1: Everyday (omitted category),  
2: More than once a week, 
3: Once a week, 4: At least once a month,  
5: Only on special holidays,  
6: Less often,  
7: Never 
 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) (2004, 2008). ESS Wave-2, ESS Wave-4-
Turkey, www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
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Appendix B 
The results of 2002 and 2007 Turkish elections 
 
 2002 2007 
Number of registered voters 41407027 42799303 
Number of Actual Voters 32768161 36056293 
Turnout Rate (%) 79.1 84.2 
Vote Shares of Political Parties   
Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) 
34.3 46.6 
Motherland Party (ANAP) 5.1 --- 
Great Union Party (BBP) 1.0 --- 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
Democratic People’s Party 
(DEHAP) 
19.4 
6.2 
20.9 
--- 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 1.2 --- 
True Path Party (DYP) 9.5 --- 
Virtue Party (FP) --- --- 
Young Party (GP) 7.2 3.0 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 8.4 14.3 
Felicity Party (SP) 2.5 2.3 
New Turkey Party (YTP) 1.2 --- 
Country Party (YT) 0.9 --- 
Independents 1.0 5.2 
Other 2.0 7.7 
 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2013). Justice and Election Statistics, 
www.tuik.gov.tr. 
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Appendix C 
Studies examining the gender gap in political attitudes 
 
Study Coverage and Data Findings 
Hayes 
(1997) 
UK 
(1992 British Election 
Survey) 
Gender does not have an 
impact on votes. Feminism 
explains party choice. 
Chaney, Alvarez and 
Nagler 
(1998) 
US 
(1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 
National Election Studies) 
The main determinants of 
the gender gap are economic 
conditions, social programs, 
military action, abortion and 
ideology. 
Studlar, McAllister 
and Hayes 
(1998) 
Australia, UK, US 
(1993 Australian Election 
Survey, 1992 British 
Election Survey, 1992 
American National Election 
Survey) 
In Australia and the UK, 
socioeconomic and 
situational factors (women’s 
adult responsibilities) 
explain the gender gap. In 
the US, political factors have 
much more effect on the 
gender gap. 
Kaufmann and 
Petroick 
(1999) 
US 
(1992, 1996 National 
Election Surveys) 
Gender gap results from the 
changing partisanship of 
men. Differences in social 
welfare opinions may be the 
main contributor to the 
gender gap. 
Inglehart and Norris 
(2000) 
60 countries 
(World Values Survey Data 
over the period 1980s and 
1990s) 
 
In postindustrial countries 
modern gender gap persists 
while in developing 
countries traditional gender 
gap prevails. 
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Appendix C (continued) 
 
Study Coverage and Data Findings 
Howell and Day 
(2000) 
US  
(1996 National Election 
Study) 
Egalitarian attitudes of 
women, their cultural roles 
and education are the main 
determinants of the gender 
gap. 
Knutsen 
(2001) 
 
Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden  
(Election Surveys from 1970s 
to 1990s) 
Gender has an important 
effect on voting behaviour. 
Different sector 
employment (public versus 
private) explains part of the 
gender gap. 
Kaufmann 
(2002) 
US  
(National Election Studies 
from 1988 to 2000) 
Reproductive rights, 
female equality, legal 
protection for homosexuals 
are increasingly significant 
determinants of party 
identification for women. 
Edlund and Pande 
(2002) 
US  
(National Election Studies, 
March Current Population 
Surveys over the period 1964-
1996) 
Strong positive correlation 
between divorce 
prevalence and the gender 
gap. 
Brooks, Nieuwbeerta 
and Manza 
(2006) 
Australia, Austria, Germany, 
The Netherlands, UK and US 
(International Social 
Cleavages and Politics (ISCP) 
Data Set over the period 1964-
1998) 
With the exception of the 
US, gender is not 
statistically significant 
variable for explaining the 
voting behaviour. 
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Appendix C (continued) 
 
Study Coverage and Data Findings 
Iversen and 
Rosenbluth 
(2006) 
Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, 
New Zealand, Sweden, UK 
and US 
(1996 International Social 
Survey Program Data) 
In countries with high divorce 
rates, working women vote for 
left parties. 
Bergh 
(2007) 
Netherlands, Norway, US 
(1996 National Election 
Study for the US, 1996 Euro 
Barometer Data for the 
Netherlands and Citizenship 
Survey from 2000 for 
Norway) 
In the US and in Norway, there 
is a strong effect of feminist 
consciousness on the gender 
gap. 
 
 
 
Giger 
(2009) 
12 Western Europe countries 
(Euro Barometer, Eurostat, 
OECD, Abramson and 
Inglehart (1995), Huber et al. 
(2004) Data Sets over the 
period 1974-2000) 
In 1976 and 1985, women 
tended to vote more for 
conservative parties while in 
2000 they have given higher 
support to leftist parties. The 
main determinant of the 
modern gender gap is the 
increasing labor force 
participation of women. 
Finseraas, Jakobsson 
and Kotsadam 
(2012) 
Norway There is a gender gap in 
political preferences. However, 
it cannot be explained by the 
risk of women’s divorce. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The dissertation has shed light on how and to what extent religion and 
religiosity influence the attitude toward corruption, the level of happiness of 
individuals and the voting behaviour of men and women.  
The first chapter has stressed that religious people are less tolerant to corruption 
and attitudes toward corruption differ across religious denominations. While 
Protestants and Hindus are more averse to corruption than Atheism other religions do 
not have clear difference. Moreover, the results show that the effect of religious 
denominations is not universal and the attitude of individuals toward corruption can 
be influenced by the fact that their religion is majority or minority. 
The second chapter has revealed that religion increases happiness. When we 
take into account both religious membership and religious devotion we find that 
religious membership without religious devotion decreases happiness. Hence, we 
argue that it is the intensity of religious attachment which raises happiness. Moreover, 
it is found that there are differences between men and women and women are more 
negatively affected by religious membership and gain more due to religiosity.  
The third chapter has shown that education and religiosity are significant 
determinants of men’s and women’s voting behaviour in Turkey which is a developing 
and a Muslim country. The results of the empirical analysis indicate that while the 
effect of religiosity on the voting behaviour of men and women is same the effect of 
education differs with regard to gender.  
The research questions investigated in this dissertation should be prolonged in 
the future. On the relationship between religion, religiosity and attitude toward 
corruption, more analyses which use micro-level data sets are needed in order to 
strengthen existing evidence at the individual level. Since our analysis on the 
relationship between religion and happiness is the first study which takes into account 
the effect of belonging to a religon and intensity of religiosity at the same time, future 
studies which consider both of these factors by using more comprehensive data sets 
would improve our understanding with regard to the impact of religion and religiosity 
on happiness. Finally, in terms of the determinants of voting behaviour, future research 
should focus on developing and Islamic countries in order to increase existing evidence 
and hence, to reach more reliable results for these countries.  
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Résumé de la thèse en Français 
 
L’économie politique est apparue comme une discipline scientifique à la fin du 
XVIIIe siècle, parallèlement aux travaux de chercheurs tels que Adam Smith, qui a 
étudié la manière dont les nations prospèrent et les politiques qui procurent la richesse 
des nations (Hall, 1997: 174). Selon Groenewegen (1991), le terme d'économie 
politique a été utilisé pour la première fois par Montchrestien (1615) en France au 
XVIIe siècle et Sir James Steuart (1767) fut le premier économiste anglais à utiliser 
«l'économie politique» dans son livre. 
Bien que le terme «économie» ait généralement représenté une «économie 
politique» jusqu'à la fin du XIXe siècle, le développement de l'économie néoclassique 
a minimisé les facteurs politiques, qui ont mis l'accent sur l'optimisation par les agents 
économiques (Drazen, 2000). Cependant, en prenant en compte l'intérêt croissant pour 
les effets des facteurs politiques sur les résultats économiques des dernières décennies, 
il est justifié d'affirmer que la «nouvelle économie politique» apparaît comme un 
domaine de recherche important ces dernières années (Drazen, 2000). 
L'économie politique se concentre principalement sur trois questions qui la 
séparent généralement de l'économie (Hall, 1997): 
1- Les économistes politiques examinent les questions de pouvoir et analysent 
spécifiquement comment un ensemble donné d'arrangements économiques affecte la 
répartition du pouvoir et des ressources entre les groupes sociaux. 
2- Les économistes politiques soulignent l'importance des arrangements 
institutionnels et examinent l'influence de différentes structures institutionnelles sur le 
fonctionnement des marchés. 
3- Les économistes politiques se concentrent sur les conceptions fondamentales 
de l'économie développées pour modéliser les questions économiques et recherchent 
principalement les origines de ces conceptions et la manière dont ces conceptions 
deviennent influentes. 
 
Les institutions en tant que déterminants de la performance économique 
 
Les institutions et l’effet de différentes structures d’institution sur les marchés 
sont parmi les principaux domaines de recherche de l’économie politique. 
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Comme on le sait, les économistes débattent depuis longtemps des 
déterminants des différences de taux de croissance des pays. Dans les années 1960, le 
modèle de croissance économique néoclassique élaboré par Ramsey (1928), Solow 
(1956) et Swan (1956) était la principale théorie de la croissance économique et ce 
modèle attribuait les différents taux de croissance des pays aux différents taux de 
capital par travailleur pays. Au cours des années 1980, la théorie de la croissance 
endogène a émergé. Alors que les premiers modèles de théorie de la croissance 
endogène développés par Romer (1986) et Lucas (1988) étaient similaires au modèle 
de croissance économique néoclassique, sauf que le capital a été étendu aux 
composants humains, des modèles ultérieurs développés par Romer (1990), Aghion et 
Howitt ( 1992) et Grossman et Helpman (1991) ont souligné le progrès technologique 
comme déterminant des différences de taux de croissance de différents pays (Barro, 
1996). Cependant, les résultats des analyses empiriques montrent que, même si les 
différences de capital physique, de capital humain et de progrès technologique sont 
prises en compte, il existe encore des différences notables dans les taux de croissance 
des pays (Helpman, 2008). 
Dans les années 90, il a été précisé que les différences de taux de croissance 
des différents pays ne pouvaient s'expliquer par la seule prise en compte de 
l’accumulation de capital ou du progrès technologique. ). La principale proposition de 
cette littérature est que les institutions ont plus d'influence sur la performance 
économique que l'accumulation de capital ou le progrès technologique, car elles 
façonnent l'environnement dans lequel ces activités se déroulent (Helpman, 2008). Par 
conséquent, les différences de performance économique avec le temps et l'espace 
proviennent des différentes structures institutionnelles des pays (North, 1990; 
Acemoglu et Robinson, 2013). 
Bien que le terme d'institutions ait longtemps été utilisé dans le domaine des 
sciences sociales, il n'existe toujours pas de définition généralement acceptée de ce 
terme (Hodgson, 2006). La plupart des chercheurs définissent les institutions comme 
«les règles du jeu» (Voigt, 2013). Selon North (1994), les institutions sont définies 
comme des contraintes «formellement conçues par l'homme (telles que règles, lois) et 
informelles (telles que normes de comportement, conventions) qui déterminent les 
structures incitatives des communautés et des économies particulières». Hodgson 
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(2006) identifie les institutions comme des «systèmes de règles sociales établies et 
dominantes qui façonnent les interactions sociales». De même, Greif (2006) définit les 
institutions comme «un système de règles, de croyances, de normes et d’organisations 
qui créent ensemble une régularité du comportement social». Payne et Losada (1999) 
utilisent une définition plus large des institutions que les autres. Selon ces auteurs, «les 
institutions sont l'ensemble des règles formelles (lois, procédures, etc.) et les normes 
et règles informelles (habitudes, convictions sociales, etc.) ainsi que les organisations 
qui créent, poursuivent et appliquent ces règles et normes». (Payne et Losada, 1999). 
Cependant, Ugur (2010) soutient que les institutions et les organisations sont des 
concepts différents puisque les instituts peuvent être créés comme solutions aux 
problèmes d'action collective et qu'ils ne peuvent être réduits aux actions des 
organisations ou des règles organisationnelles. 
Comme il ressort clairement des explications ci-dessus, il n’ya pas de définition 
unanime des institutions et différents auteurs insistent sur les différents aspects des 
institutions. 
La portée et les dimensions des institutions n'étant pas claires, il existe 
différentes mesures des institutions. Selon Glaeser et al. (2004), les indicateurs les plus 
fréquemment utilisés dans les analyses récentes sont les indicateurs d'enquête de la 
qualité institutionnelle du Guide international du risque pays, les indicateurs de 
gouvernance mondiale collectés par Kaufmann, Kraay et Mastruzzi (2011) et 
l'ensemble de données Polity IV (Marshall et Jaggers, 2007). 
International Country Risk Guide fournit des informations et des prévisions sur 
les risques financiers, politiques et économiques pour 140 pays. De plus, le modèle 
axé sur les affaires du International Country Risk Guide examine des facteurs 
spécifiques à un pays tels que le risque de change, l’armée et la religion dans la 
politique et la corruption. 
Les indicateurs de gouvernance dans le monde mesurent six dimensions de la 
gouvernance: voix et responsabilité, stabilité politique et absence de violence / 
terrorisme, efficacité du gouvernement, qualité de la réglementation, primauté du droit 
et contrôle de la corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay et Mastruzzi, 2011). Les indicateurs 
agrégés sont calculés à partir de plusieurs centaines de variables individuelles et les 
données représentent les points de vue sur la gouvernance des répondants et des 
experts des secteurs public, privé et des ONG (Kaufmann, Kraay et Mastruzzi, 2011). 
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Enfin, l'ensemble de données Polity IV mesure les caractéristiques d'autorité 
des États dans le système mondial (Marshall et Jaggers, 2007). Le dernier ensemble 
de données du projet Polity IV couvrant la période 1800-2016 représente des «modèles 
d'autorité» démocratiques et autocratiques et des changements de régime dans 167 
pays. 
Bien que les ensembles de données susmentionnés soient fréquemment utilisés 
pour mesurer la qualité institutionnelle dans les analyses empiriques, ils sont 
également validés par certains chercheurs. Woodruff (2006) soutient qu’il existe une 
forte corrélation entre les différentes mesures des institutions et qu’il est donc presque 
impossible de séparer les effets des différentes institutions. Glaeser et al. (2004) 
indiquent que les indicateurs communément utilisés des institutions mesurent le 
résultat des choix politiques au lieu des institutions elles-mêmes. Ces dernières années, 
on a tenté de mesurer les institutions plus précisément (Voigt, 2013). Cependant, il 
n'existe toujours pas de mesure des institutions généralement acceptée et sans faille. 
Par conséquent, d'autres analyses sont nécessaires pour parvenir à de meilleures 
mesures des institutions. 
Bien qu'il n'y ait pas de définition unanime et une mesure sans faille des 
institutions, de nombreuses études prouvent que les institutions affectent la 
performance économique (voir par exemple Commander et Nikoloski, 2010; Nawaz, 
2015 et Constantine, 2017). Cependant, en ce qui concerne les déterminants des 
institutions et la qualité institutionnelle, les preuves existantes sont moins organisées 
(Straub, 2000). 
 
Les déterminants des institutions 
 
Dans la littérature empirique existante, divers facteurs sont pris en compte en 
tant que déterminants potentiels des institutions et de la qualité institutionnelle. Ces 
facteurs sont classés en quatre groupes principaux (Straub, 2000; Mijiyawa, 2013): 
variables historiques, variables d'incitation politique, variables de loyer et variables 
culturelles24. 
                                                          
24 Selon Straub (2000), il existe également des incitations bureaucratiques pouvant affecter la qualité 
des institutions et des institutions. Cependant, Straub (2000) affirme qu’il s’agit d’un complément aux 
loyers. De ce fait, les incitations bureaucratiques ne sont pas expliquées ici comme une catégorie 
distincte. 
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Le premier groupe contient des variables historiques. Les pionniers de 
l’argument centré sur l’influence des variables historiques sur les institutions sont 
Acemoglu, Johnson et Robinson (2001, 2003). Selon ces auteurs, les différentes 
politiques de colonisation menées par les Européens dans différentes colonies 
conduisaient à des institutions extractives qui ne protégeaient pas beaucoup la 
propriété privée et les contrepoids ou institutions qui soulignaient la propriété privée 
et les pouvoirs publics (Acemoglu, Johnson et Robinson, 2001). 2002). 
Le deuxième groupe couvre les variables d'incitation politique. Selon les 
auteurs qui soulignent le rôle du système politique, les institutions sont déterminées 
par un groupe d'individus qui contrôlent le pouvoir politique (Mijiyawa, 2013). 
Acemoglu (2002) avance que les institutions inefficaces sont choisies par les 
politiciens ou les groupes sociaux qui détiennent le pouvoir politique puisque les 
institutions choisies servent leurs intérêts. Les études empiriques qui examinent l’effet 
des facteurs politiques sur les institutions constatent que de meilleurs freins et 
contrepoids conduisent à de meilleures institutions (Straub, 2000). 
Le troisième groupe comprend les variables de loyer. En théorie économique, 
il est dit que l’existence de rentes augmente la probabilité que les fonctionnaires 
s’écartent des comportements honnêtes (Straub, 2000). La littérature étudie les loyers 
exogènes issus des ressources naturelles d'un pays et les rentes non naturelles émanant 
des dimensions des organisations économiques qui mènent à un pouvoir 
monopolistique (Siba, 2008). Dans la littérature empirique existante, les résultats de 
nombreuses analyses montrent que les rentes naturelles et non naturelles ont des effets 
négatifs sur la qualité des établissements (Treisman, 2000; Ades et Di Tella, 1999; 
Leite et Weidmann (1999); Acemoglu, Johnson et Robinson, 2001). 
Enfin, le quatrième groupe comprend des variables culturelles. Dans la 
littérature, il est suggéré que les variations culturelles ou les variations des croyances 
idéologiques peuvent entraîner des différences dans les institutions économiques 
(Mijiyawa, 2013). La culture est un concept ambigu et a plusieurs dimensions. Selon 
Gorodnichenko et Roland (2010), la culture est généralement décrite comme 
«l'ensemble des valeurs et des croyances que les gens ont sur le fonctionnement du 
monde et sur les normes de comportement découlant de cet ensemble de valeurs». En 
termes de résultats institutionnels, Tabellini (2008) définit la culture «comme un 
ensemble de principes et de règles normatives qui motivent les individus». 
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Les chercheurs qui insistent sur les effets des facteurs culturels sur les 
institutions avancent que les différentes croyances et comportements des différentes 
communautés forment leur action collective, la qualité de leurs gouvernements et de 
leurs institutions (Mijiyawa, 2013). Cet argument a été suggéré pour la première fois 
par Weber (1930) dans son livre «Ethique protestante et esprit du capitalisme». Weber 
(1930) a déclaré que la culture était un facteur crucial pour expliquer les différences 
de développement économique. Putman, Leonardi et Nonetti (1993) ont enquêté sur 
les gouvernements régionaux créés par le gouvernement central au début des années 
1970. Bien que l'on s'attendait à ce que ces nouveaux gouvernements régionaux 
travaillent de manière identique, les auteurs ont déclaré que dans la pratique leurs 
travaux étaient différents. Selon eux, cette différence découle de différences dans les 
niveaux de coopération, de participation, d’interaction sociale et de confiance, qui sont 
les principales caractéristiques du capital social. 
L'une des dimensions fondamentales de la culture est la religion. Il existe de 
nombreuses études qui examinent l’impact des différentes religions et le niveau de 
religiosité sur les institutions et la qualité institutionnelle dans la littérature existante. 
La Porta et al. (1999) soutiennent que la religion peut déterminer les attitudes 
culturelles à l'égard de la hiérarchie sociale et constate empiriquement que les pays où 
la proportion de catholiques ou de musulmans est élevée sont de mauvaise qualité dans 
les activités gouvernementales. Treisman (2000, 2007) examine les déterminants de la 
corruption et constate que les pays de tradition protestante sont moins corrompus que 
les pays d’autres religions. North, Orman et Gwin (2013) étudient la relation entre la 
religion, la corruption et l'État de droit en utilisant un vaste ensemble de données 
couvrant 207 pays. Selon les résultats empiriques, North, Orman et Gwin (2013) 
suggèrent que la corruption et la primauté du droit sont liées à l'héritage religieux d'un 
pays. 
Outre la qualité institutionnelle, la religion peut également influer sur le niveau 
de bonheur des individus et leurs choix politiques. De nombreuses études examinent 
empiriquement la relation entre religion, religiosité et bonheur. L’une des premières 
études appartient à James (1902) qui affirme que la religion a joué un rôle crucial dans 
le bonheur des personnes. En examinant les analyses empiriques existantes, Lewis et 
Cruise (2006) affirment que si les résultats de nombreuses études indiquent une 
association positive entre la religion et le bonheur, certaines études ont des résultats 
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contradictoires (voir par exemple Lewis, Maltby et Burkinshaw, 2000). Dans une étude 
récente, Ngamaba et Soni (2017) examinent l'influence de différentes religions sur le 
bonheur et la satisfaction de vivre et examinent si l'effet de la religion sur le bonheur 
et la satisfaction de vivre peut changer avec l'environnement économique et culturel 
du pays. En utilisant le World Values Survey couvrant la période comprise entre 1981 
et 2014, Ngamaba et Soni (2017) ont constaté que la religiosité individuelle et le 
niveau de développement d'un pays sont des déterminants importants du bien-être 
subjectif des individus. De plus, les auteurs trouvent que les protestants, les 
bouddhistes et les catholiques romains sont plus heureux que les autres groupes 
religieux (Ngamaba et Soni, 2017). Bien que de nombreuses études se concentrent sur 
la relation entre religion, religiosité et bonheur, d'autres enquêtes et analyses sont 
nécessaires pour parvenir à des résultats plus robustes et sûrs concernant l'effet de la 
religion sur le bonheur (Rizvi et Hossain, 2017). 
En tant qu’aspect important de la culture, la religion et la religiosité peuvent 
influer sur le comportement de vote des individus. Bien que la religion et la religiosité 
aient été ignorées comme facteur déterminant du comportement électoral au cours des 
années 1990, un certain nombre de chercheurs européens ont suggéré ces dernières 
années que la religion reste un facteur important à prendre en compte dans les analyses 
de vote (Goldberg, 2014). Dans la littérature existante, alors que certaines études 
étudient le comportement électoral d'individus appartenant à différentes religions, 
d'autres études analysent la relation entre la religiosité et les choix électoraux (Esmer 
et Pettersson, 2007). Selon les résultats de nombreuses études empiriques, il est 
confirmé que la religion et la religiosité sont des déterminants importants du 
comportement électoral dans les pays occidentaux (Esmer et Pettersson, 2007). 
Cependant, le nombre d’études examinant les relations. 
  
Contenu de la thèse 
 
Le but de ce travail est d’étudier les effets de la religion et de la religiosité sur 
la corruption, le bonheur des individus et le comportement électoral. Bien que de 
nombreuses études examinent ces questions, nous fournissons de nouvelles preuves en 
utilisant différents ensembles de données et méthodologies et en nous concentrant sur 
les pays qui n'ont pas été analysés dans les études précédentes. 
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Le premier chapitre25 analyse la relation entre la religion et l'attitude envers la 
corruption au niveau individuel. La corruption est une dimension fondamentale des 
institutions, dont les effets négatifs sur l'investissement et la croissance ont été 
démontrés (Mauro, 1995). L'impact de la religion sur la corruption est un moyen par 
lequel la culture peut façonner les institutions. Dans la littérature existante, de 
nombreuses études empiriques examinent les déterminants de la corruption, y compris 
la religion. Cependant, la majorité de ces études s’appuient sur des ensembles de 
données nationaux et ne tiennent donc pas compte de l’hétérogénéité des individus à 
l’intérieur d’un pays en regroupant tous les individus. De plus, ces études ne 
permettent pas de déterminer si le comportement des individus liés à la corruption est 
subordonné au fait que leur religion domine dans leur pays. 
La contribution de ce chapitre à la littérature est double: premièrement, en 
examinant l'impact de la religion sur l'attitude à l'égard de la corruption au niveau 
individuel, nous fournissons une analyse approfondie de cette question par rapport aux 
études nationales. Deuxièmement, nous évaluons l'attitude envers la corruption des 
individus à travers les pays avec des religions majoritaires différentes et nous vérifions 
donc si l'impact des confessions religieuses sur l'attitude envers la corruption est 
universel ou conditionnel au statut de la religion. 
De plus, nous étudions l'influence des confessions religieuses dans quatre pays 
avec plusieurs grands groupes religieux afin de procéder à une analyse plus complète. 
Dans l'analyse empirique de ce chapitre, nous utilisons World Values Survey Wave 6 
pour la période 2010-2014. Puisque nous cherchons à expliquer l'attitude envers la 
corruption, nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure «Quelqu'un acceptant un pot-
de-vin dans l'exercice de ses fonctions ”Est justifiable. La réponse à cette question est 
qu’une variable catégorielle sur une échelle de dix points avec des valeurs plus élevées 
est plus justifiable que la corruption. Nous nous concentrons sur les principales 
religions du monde, conformément aux études précédentes sur l'influence de la 
religion. Pour la religiosité, nous utilisons la fréquence de la participation aux services 
religieux et la fréquence de la prière. 
Dans un premier temps, nous estimons notre modèle en utilisant une seule des 
variables de religion / religiosité avec les variables de contrôle. Après cela, nous 
                                                          
25 Ce chapitre fait référence à l'article co-écrit avec Laurent Weill. L'article a été présenté à la conférence 
European Public Choice Society en 2017. 
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estimons à nouveau le modèle en ajoutant les termes d'interaction entre la 
dénomination religieuse et la présence / prière religieuse. Ensuite, nous estimons 
séparément le modèle pour les pays dans lesquels la religion dominante est le 
catholicisme romain, le christianisme orthodoxe, le protestantisme et l'islam. Enfin, 
nous estimons notre modèle pour les pays multi-religieux, à savoir l'Allemagne, le 
Liban, la Malaisie et le Nigeria. 
Les résultats de cette analyse empirique indiquent que les personnes religieuses 
sont moins tolérantes à la corruption et que les attitudes à l'égard de la corruption 
diffèrent selon les confessions religieuses. De plus, les résultats montrent que l'effet 
des dénominations religieuses n'est pas universel et que l'attitude des individus envers 
la corruption peut être influencée par le fait que leur religion est majoritaire ou 
minoritaire. 
Le deuxième chapitre26 évalue l'effet de la religion sur le bonheur. Bien que de 
nombreuses études étudient la relation entre la religion et divers indicateurs 
économiques (pour une revue de la littérature, voir Dolan et al. (2008)), le nombre 
d'analyses portant sur la relation entre religion et bonheur est très faible. Les analyses 
empiriques existantes prennent en compte soit les effets des confessions religieuses, 
soit la religiosité sur le bonheur (Bjørnskov et al., 2008, Clark et Lelkes, 2009, Deaton 
et Stone, 2013). Contrairement aux études précédentes, nous contrôlons 
simultanément l'appartenance religieuse et l'intensité de la religiosité. À notre 
connaissance, il s'agit de la première étude qui considère à la fois l'effet de 
l'appartenance à une religion et l'intensité de la religiosité sur le bonheur. 
Dans notre analyse empirique, nous utilisons les quatre premières vagues de 
l'enquête sociale européenne réalisée tous les deux ans entre 2000 et 2008 dans 30 pays 
d'Europe et ses environs. Notre variable dépendante est la réponse des participants à 
la question suivante: «Toutes choses confondues, dans quelle mesure diriez-vous que 
vous êtes? Les dénominations religieuses que nous prenons en compte dans notre 
analyse sont le catholicisme romain, le protestantisme, le christianisme orthodoxe 
oriental, l’autre christianité, le judaïsme, l’islam et une autre catégorie qui couvre les 
individus sans appartenance religieuse et autres affiliations non chrétiennes. Pour la 
                                                          
26 Ce chapitre fait référence à l'article co-écrit avec Jan Fidrmuc. L'article a été présenté à la conférence 
European Public Choice Society en 2015 et a été publié sous la forme d'un document de travail CESifo 
(document de travail n ° 5437). 
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religiosité, nous utilisons une question sur l'intensité du dévouement des répondants et 
nous considérons la participation à des activités religieuses 
Nous observons que la religion augmente le bonheur. Cependant, lorsque nous 
prenons en compte à la fois l'adhésion religieuse et la dévotion religieuse, nous 
trouvons que l'appartenance religieuse sans dévotion religieuse réduit le bonheur. Nous 
soutenons donc que l'aspect spirituel et fondé sur la croyance de la religion suscite le 
bonheur. De plus, les différences entre hommes et femmes sont importantes. Les 
femmes sont plus touchées par l’appartenance à une religion et par la religiosité. 
Le troisième chapitre27 examine les déterminants du comportement de vote des 
citoyens turcs et se concentre spécifiquement sur la manière dont les différences liées 
au sexe dans le comportement de vote ont façonné la montée de l'AKP en Turquie. 
Bien que les différences entre les sexes dans les attitudes politiques et les 
comportements de vote aient des effets dramatiques sur les résultats des élections tant 
dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement, la majorité des études 
examinent cette question pour les pays développés. Ce chapitre contribue à la 
littérature existante en fournissant des éléments de preuve concernant le comportement 
de vote des individus en Turquie, pays à la fois en développement et musulman. Ces 
dernières années, le Parti de la justice et du développement (connu sous le nom d'AKP, 
son acronyme turc) a pris de l'ampleur dans la sphère politique turque. La Turquie sous 
le régime de l'AKP a progressivement abandonné la laïcité stricte. D'un côté, cela a 
sans doute accru la liberté de religion. En revanche, une plus grande acceptation des 
normes islamiques peut avoir un effet asymétrique négatif sur la vie des femmes, car 
une interprétation conservatrice des normes islamiques attribue des rôles différents aux 
hommes et aux femmes dans la plupart des aspects de la vie quotidienne. Par 
conséquent, il peut y avoir des différences dans le soutien à l'AKP parmi les électeurs 
masculins et féminins. 
Dans notre analyse empirique, nous étudions les déterminants du soutien à 
l’AKP et au principal parti d’opposition, le Parti du peuple républicain (connu sous le 
nom de CHP, son acronyme turc). Nous utilisons l'enquête sociale européenne Vague 
2 (collectée en 2004) et la vague 4 (collectées en 2008), qui incluent des informations 
sur le comportement électoral passé lors des élections de 2002 et 2007, respectivement. 
                                                          
27 Ce chapitre fait référence à l'article co-écrit avec Jan Fidrmuc. L'article a été présenté lors de la 
conférence European Public Choice Society en 2014 et a été publié sous la forme d'un document de 
travail CESifo (document de travail n ° 5226). 
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Notre variable dépendante prend la valeur 1 si le répondant a voté pour le parti en 
question lors de la dernière élection et zéro sinon. Nos variables explicatives 
représentent les caractéristiques socioéconomiques des participants, telles que l’âge, 
le sexe, le nombre d’années d’études, l’état matrimonial, etc., ainsi que la religiosité. 
Les résultats de notre analyse empirique indiquent que l’éducation et la 
religiosité sont des déterminants importants du comportement électoral des hommes 
et des femmes. Si l’effet de la religiosité sur le comportement électoral des hommes et 
des femmes est le même, l’effet de l’éducation diffère selon le sexe. Nous constatons 
que le soutien des femmes à l’AKP diminue avec l’augmentation des niveaux 
d’éducation, alors que le soutien des hommes à l’AKP s’accroît d’abord puis diminue. 
Le soutien à la cogénération, principal parti d'opposition, est opposé. Cependant, ce 
résultat ne prévaut que lors des élections de 2002. Lors des élections de 2007, 
l’éducation a eu un effet négatif sur les votes de l’AKP, tant pour les hommes que pour 
les femmes. De plus, un écart type entre les sexes se dégage lors des élections de 2007, 
les femmes étant plus susceptibles de voter pour le CHP que les hommes. 
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Résumé 
Le but de ce travail est d’examiner les effets de la religion et de la religiosité 
sur la corruption, le bonheur des individus et le comportement électoral. Nous 
contribuons à la littérature existante en fournissant de nouvelles preuves et en nous 
concentrant sur les pays non analysés dans les études précédentes. 
Le premier chapitre analyse les relations entre religion, religiosité et attitude 
face à la corruption au niveau individuel. L'analyse empirique révèle que les personnes 
religieuses sont moins tolérantes à la corruption et que les attitudes à l'égard de la 
corruption diffèrent d'une confession religieuse à l'autre. De plus, les résultats montrent 
que l'effet des confessions religieuses n'est pas universel et que l'attitude des individus 
à l'égard de la corruption peut être influencée par le fait que leur religion est majoritaire 
ou minoritaire. 
Le deuxième chapitre évalue l’effet de la religion sur le bonheur. Selon les 
résultats de notre analyse empirique, la religion augmente le bonheur. Cependant, 
lorsque l’appartenance religieuse et la dévotion religieuse sont prises en compte 
ensemble, on constate que l’appartenance à une religion sans dévotion religieuse 
diminue le bonheur. Nous soutenons donc que l’aspect spirituel et religieux de la 
religion suscite le bonheur. De plus, les différences entre hommes et femmes sont 
significatives. L'appartenance à une religion affecte plus négativement les femmes et 
leur gagne davantage en raison de leur religiosité. 
Le troisième chapitre étudie les déterminants du comportement électoral des 
citoyens turcs et s'intéresse plus particulièrement à la manière dont les différences de 
comportement électoral liées au sexe ont façonné l'essor de l'AKP en Turquie. Les 
résultats de notre analyse empirique indiquent que l’éducation et la religiosité sont des 
déterminants importants du comportement électoral des hommes et des femmes. Si 
l’effet de la religiosité sur le comportement électoral des hommes et des femmes est le 
même, l’effet de l’éducation diffère en ce qui concerne le sexe. Nous constatons que 
le soutien des femmes à l’AKP diminue avec l’augmentation des niveaux d’éducation, 
tandis que celui des hommes à l’AKP augmente tout d’abord, puis diminue. Le soutien 
au CHP, le principal parti d'opposition, est opposé. Cependant, ce résultat ne prévaut 
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que lors de l'élection de 2002. Lors de l'élection de 2007, l'éducation a un effet négatif 
sur les votes pour l'AKP, tant pour les hommes que pour les femmes. En outre, un écart 
type entre hommes et femmes se dégage des élections de 2007, les femmes étant plus 
susceptibles que les hommes de voter pour le PSC. 
 
Mots Clés: institutions, religion, religiosité, corruption, bonheur, vote, fossé des 
genres 
 
 
Résumé en Anglais 
 The aim of this work is to investigate the effects of religion and religiosity on 
corruption, individuals’ happiness and voting behaviour. We contribute to the existing 
literature by providing new evidence and by focusing on the countries which are not 
analysed in the previous studies.  
The first chapter analyses the relationship between religion, religiosity and the 
attitude toward corruption at the individual level. In the empirical analysis it is found 
that religious people are less tolerant to corruption and attitudes toward corruption 
differ across religious denominations. Moreover, the results show that the effect of 
religious denominations is not universal and the attitude of individuals toward 
corruption can be influenced by the fact that their religion is majority or minority. 
The second chapter assesses the effect of religion on happiness. According to 
the results of our empirical analysis, religion increases happiness. However, when 
religious membership and religious devotion are taken into account together it is found 
that religious membership without religious devotion lowers happiness. So, we argue 
that the spiritual and belief-based aspect of religion raises happiness. Moreover, the 
differences between men and women are significant. Women are more negatively 
affected by belonging to a religion and gain more due to religiosity. 
The third chapter investigates the determinants of voting behaviour of Turkish 
citizens and specifically focuses on how gender-related differences in voting 
behaviour shaped the rise of the AKP in Turkey. The results of our empirical analysis 
indicate that education and religiosity are significant determinants of men’s and 
women’s voting behaviour. Whilst the effect of religiosity on men’s and women’s 
voting behaviour is same the effect of education differs with regard to gender. We find 
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that women’s support for the AKP falls with increasing education levels while men’s 
support for the AKP rises first and then falls. The support for CHP, the main opposition 
party, is opposite. However, this result only prevails in the 2002 election. In the 2007 
election, education has a negative effect on the votes for the AKP for both men and 
women. Moreover, a standard gender gap emerges in the 2007 election, with women 
more likely to vote for the CHP than men. 
 
Keywords: institutions, religion, religiosity, corruption, happiness, voting, gender gap 
 
 
